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ABSTRACT 
Army Special Forces units are trained to conduct sensitive special operations 
including unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, direct action and strategic 
reconnaissance missions.  Many of the unique skills and capabilities found in Special 
Forces units have potential applications to homeland security operations.  Despite an 
absence of doctrine for domestic operations, Special Forces — especially Army National 
Guard Special Forces — are likely to be employed in future homeland security 
operations.  This thesis examines potential homeland security missions for Special 
Forces.  Additionally, given the unique first-responder role of the National Guard, this 
thesis analyzes potential policy changes needed to enhance National Guard Special 
Forces contributions to homeland security.  The absence of doctrine for domestic Special 
Forces operations potentially adversely impacts Army National Guard Special Forces.  
Given the unique constitutionally mandated nature of the National Guard, state governors 
have the ability to activate their forces, including Army National Guard Special Forces, 
for homeland security operations.  The absence of doctrine for domestic Special Forces 
operations can potentially lead to the misuse, overuse or illegal use of these strategic 
assets.  Enhancing the National Guard’s capacity to correctly use Special Forces in 
domestic operations will enhance the country’s overall security posture.     
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Army Special Forces units are trained to conduct sensitive special operations 
including unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, direct action and strategic 
reconnaissance missions.  Many of the unique skills and capabilities found in Special 
Forces units have potential applications to homeland security operations.  Despite an 
absence of doctrine for domestic operations, Special Forces — especially Army National 
Guard Special Forces — are likely to be employed in future homeland security 
operations.  This thesis examines potential homeland security missions for Special 
Forces.  Additionally, given the unique first-responder role of the National Guard, this 
thesis analyzes potential policy changes needed to enhance National Guard Special 
Forces contributions to homeland security.        
A. DESCRIPTION AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM 
Current doctrine for Special Forces fails to anticipate or even contemplate the use 
of Special Forces in domestic operations.  This lack of strategic vision is apparently 
reinforced by a leadership emphasis that is focused solely on the use of Special Forces in 
the overseas war fight.    Killing or capturing terrorists before they can attack the 
homeland is likely a defensible and prudent resource allocation; assuming that Special 
Forces will never conduct domestic operations, however, is a flawed proposition.   
Equally troubling, the absence of doctrine for domestic Special Forces operations 
potentially adversely impacts Army National Guard Special Forces.  Given the unique 
constitutionally mandated nature of the National Guard, state governors have the ability 
to activate their forces, including Army National Guard Special Forces, for homeland 
security operations.  The absence of doctrine for domestic Special Forces operations can 
potentially lead to the misuse, overuse or illegal use of these strategic assets. 
Given its dual nature as both a federal and state asset, Army National Guard 
Special Forces units are well situated to provide specialized capabilities in both homeland  
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defense and civil support operations.  Enhancing the National Guard’s capacity to 
correctly use Special Forces in domestic operations will enhance the country’s overall 
security posture.     
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Very little academic literature relates to the use of Army Special Forces in 
homeland security operations.  The modest amount of literature that does exist fails to 
address the use of National Guard Special Forces in Title 32 (state) status.  The lack of 
literature may be an indication that Special Forces have not been fully integrated into 
homeland security planning and operations.   
In April 2002, Dr. Jacquelyn Davis and Dr. Charles Perry issued a workshop 
report entitled Homeland Security and Special Operations, Sorting out Procedures, 
Capabilities, and Operational Issues.1  While the report cannot be considered literature, 
it does offer key insight into the views of high-level, federal policy makers.  This report 
summarizes the consensus of the participants in a January 2002 workshop conducted by 
the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA) on behalf of the Defense Threat 
Reduction Agency (DTRA).   Among others, the participants included the commander of 
U.S. Special Operations Command, the commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command, the 
principal deputy assistant of defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict 
(SOLIC), the director of operations for the Joint Staff, and the assistant to the chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs for National Guard matters.   
The overwhelming sense of the conference participants was that, given the 
operational requirements of the Global War on Terror, additional homeland security 
responsibilities for Special Operations Forces (SOF)2 were untenable.  In short, the 
participants felt that the optimum use of SOF warriors was not in the United States, but 
overseas — to go after terrorists where they live and plan their activities.  According to 
                                                 
1 Dr. Jacquelyn K. Davis, “Homeland Security and Special Operations; Sorting Out Procedures, 
Capabilities and Operational Issues.” Workshop Report (April 2002).  
2 The term Special Operations Forces describes active and reserve component personnel from all 
services ultimately assigned to the U.S. Special Operations Command.  Within the Army, this includes 
Special Forces.  See also 10 USC 167.   
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the workshop report, the participants did discuss, in very broad terms, the concept of 
using National Guard forces in Title 32 status to respond to domestic emergencies.  
However, it seems they did not specifically address the use of National Guard Special 
Forces.  In fact, the report states that the participants recognized that active SOF (as 
opposed to reserve component forces) should be employed in order to defeat the use of 
weapons of mass destruction in the United States.  The report also concedes that SOF 
may be utilized to train law enforcement and other national agencies in WMD specific-
mission tasks.  The only significant discussion regarding reserve component forces dealt 
with Army Reserve Civil Affairs units.  The participants apparently did not address the 
significant difficulties in mobilizing and deploying Army Reserve forces (as opposed to 
National Guard forces) to respond to homeland security situations. 
In addition, while the current doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces 
acknowledges the possibility of domestic operations, it neither elaborates on potential 
missions nor discusses the potential use of National Guard Special Forces units in a 
domestic capacity.  For example, Army Field Manual (FM) 3-05, Army Special 
Operations Forces, simply notes that civil support operations are one of the four missions 
within full spectrum operations that Special Operations Forces (SOF) must be prepared to 
conduct.3 
Apparent in the limited research that exists is an overwhelming bias toward Title 
10 (federal) forces.  Research to date fails to even contemplate the use of National Guard 
Special Forces for homeland security operations.  For instance, the available literature 
includes a significant discussion on the limitations imposed on military forces via the 
Posse Comitatus Act (PCA).4  Stated simply, the PCA prohibits the use of federal 
military forces to enforce civil laws.  One of the potential advantages to National Guard 
Special Forces, however, is the fact that the PCA is not applicable to the National Guard 
in Title 32 (state) status.  Despite the bias toward federal forces, some literature discusses 
                                                 
3 Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-05, Army Special Operations Forces, 
September 20, 2006.  
4 Colonel Steven G. Buteau, “The Role of Special Operations Forces in U.S. Homeland Security and 
Homeland Defense,” United States Army War College (March 2005).  
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possible roles for Special Forces.5  Since the literature is focused only on active duty, 
federal forces, however, the roles and potential contributions are limited.  Thus far, the 
possible functions identified include: 
 
• Intelligence and Early Warning.  Special Forces can contribute through “Red 
Team” analysis.  In other words, Special Forces could provide analysis from 
the perspective of the terrorist, and provide valuable feedback to the homeland 
security community. 
 
• Vulnerability Assessments.  Special Forces can assess the vulnerability of 
critical infrastructure sites and assist in developing tactics, techniques and 
procedures to defend critical infrastructure.   
 
• Counterterrorism Operations.  In extreme circumstances, Special Forces can 
be employed to apprehend or attack terrorists. 
 
• Counterproliferation Operations.  In the event a weapon of mass destruction is 
located within the United States, Special Forces could be dispatched to seize 
or secure the weapon.   
 
More recently, Colonel Chris Sorenson of U.S. Northern Command “introduced 
the question of whether Special Operations Forces should operate in the homeland to 
defeat an enemy that intends to fight us on our soil.”6  This publication contemplates an 
improvised explosive device (IED) campaign in the homeland, and suggests that “an 
asymmetrical campaign in the homeland may entail the appropriate use of Special 
Operations Forces.”7  Colonel Sorenson further advocates that the time to determine the 
appropriate role for SOF in the homeland is now, before any attack.  Notably, Colonel 
Sorenson, echoing the workshop results above, concludes that the initial reaction of 
civilian and military leaders will be to attempt to engage the enemy in the foreign 
environment, saving “its limited SOF resources to attack a presumed foreign-based center 
of gravity (COG).”8   
                                                 
5 Buteau, “The Role of Special Operations Forces,” 7.  
6 Chris Sorenson, Preparing for the End Game-SOF in the Homeland? Hurlburt Field, Florida: Joint 
Special Operations University Press, June 2007. 
7 Ibid., 1.  
8 Ibid.,  5.  
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The collected works of literature and doctrine addressing the use of Special 
Forces in domestic operations is almost non-existent.  Therefore, researching the use of 
these forces for homeland security operations will make a new contribution to the body of 
homeland security literature.     
C. METHODOLOGY 
The research contained in this thesis examines potential Special Forces roles, 
missions and tasks for homeland security.  While the potential Special Forces missions 
identified will be doctrinally based and thus applicable to all Special Forces, this research 
recognizes that given their unique nature, National Guard Special Forces are more likely 
to be called upon to conduct homeland security operations.  First, the doctrinal missions 
and roles of Special Forces will be analyzed in order to determine existing capabilities of 
value to homeland defense and security.  This is critical, considering the overwhelming 
demands of the Global War on Terror leave no additional training time or spare forces in 
which to develop new capabilities.   This doctrinal framework will be applied to analyze 
case studies involving the use of National Guard Special Forces in homeland security 
operations.   This result will be compared to existing policies, laws and regulations in 
order to determine what changes are required to facilitate an enhanced role for National 
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II. OVERVIEW OF U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES 
This chapter will provide a brief overview of Army Special Forces, and will 
summarize some of the unique attributes that make Special Forces well suited to conduct 
a number of homeland security missions.  In part, this chapter will attempt to explain 
what makes Special Forces “special.”  The core competencies expected of Special Forces 
soldiers will be addressed, including how these competencies may be applicable to 
homeland security operations.  Additionally, the organization and structure of Special 
Forces will be described in order to conceptualize how these forces might be rapidly 
deployed in domestic operations.  Finally, this chapter will explain the core tasks and 
collateral activities of Special Forces.   
A. CORE COMPETENCIES OF THE SPECIAL FORCES SOLDIER 
Since most Special Forces soldiers serve in another military occupational 
specialty before becoming Special Forces, they are older and generally more mature than 
the average soldier.   On average, it takes about a full year or more to produce a Special 
Forces soldier, not including basic military training or advanced Special Forces skills 
training.  As a result of this maturity and training, more is expected from Special Forces 
operators than the average soldier.  Every Special Forces soldier is expected to be a 
master of the core competencies listed in the Army field manual Special Forces 
Operations,9 as described below.  
Warfighting.  “SF soldiers are tactically competent and have advanced 
training in operations, intelligence, medical skills, engineering, 
communications, and heavy and light weapons.10”  They have the 
capability to conduct light infantry operations unilaterally, or combined 
with other U.S. or allied forces.   
Development of Human Infrastructure.  Special Forces soldiers use locals 
in their area of operation to facilitate intelligence collection and to support 
other activities.         
                                                 
9 Department of the Army, Army Field Manual (FM) 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations, 2006.  
10 Ibid., 1-6.  
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Training.  Teaching and training others is a hallmark of Special Forces 
operations.  Special Forces soldiers are expected to be fully competent to 
assess training requirements, plan, execute and evaluate training courses 
for U.S. and friendly forces. 
Interagency, Joint, Combined and Multinational Operations.  Special 
Forces operations are inherently joint and interagency affairs.  SF soldiers 
are expected to “understand the requirements of other agencies, services or 
nations to accomplish the mission.”11  Ambiguous missions with 
conflicting agendas and goals are to be expected. 
Physical Fitness.  Due to the demands of operating in austere and hostile 
environments, Special Forces soldiers are expected to maintain high levels 
of fitness. 
Interpersonal and Cross-Cultural Communications.  Special Forces 
soldiers are capable of sizing up situations, building rapport and 
influencing people in order to obtain a desired result.  Often, this 
relationship building will take place in foreign lands.  Cross-cultural 
communications are essential to working with host nations or indigenous 
forces.  Special Forces soldiers are trained to be proficient in another 
language targeted to their assigned area of operation.  Additionally, cross-
cultural communications skills and an understanding of native populations 
are essential to cultivating personal and professional relationships. 
Problem Solving.  Special Forces soldiers are conditioned to look for 
innovative solutions to complex problems.  This “thinking outside the 
box” mentality is a point of pride to the Special Forces community.  “SF 
soldiers analyze a situation and then adapt and apply doctrine, techniques, 
and methods in a culturally sensitive and suitable manner to resolve 
difficult issues in nonstandard situations.”12  By approaching challenges in 
a flexible manner, Special Forces soldiers more easily adapt to uncertain 
situations. 
Clandestine Infiltration and Exfiltration.  Special Forces maintain 
capabilities in underwater SCUBA operations, military free-fall 
parachuting and other specialized skill sets needed to enter or exit an area 
of operation without drawing attention. All Special Forces soldiers are 
military parachutists.  
                                                 
11 Department of the Army, Army Field Manual (FM) 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations, 2006  
12 Ibid. 
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Political Awareness.  Special Forces soldiers strive to understand the 
political implications in any given situation.  They consider not only the 
implications to U.S. foreign policy, but also the political dynamics in the 
country in which they are operating.    
Austere or Hostile Environments.  “SF Soldiers maintain the ability to 
operate for extended periods in hostile, remote, and austere environments 
with little or no external support.”13     
These core competencies, infused into a mature soldier through some of the most 
demanding training in the Army, produces an operator capable of using cross-cultural 
communications to produce results in ambiguous, austere environments.  Many of these 
core competencies are advantageous to homeland security operations.  For example, the 
nature of homeland security dictates that operations will take place within an interagency 
setting.  As with any military domestic operation, political dynamics will likely impact 
operational realities.  Within this environment, mature Special Forces soldiers, using their 
interpersonal skills and problem-solving abilities, can be expected to apply flexible, 
innovative techniques in order to accomplish the mission. 
B. ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE OF SPECIAL FORCES 
By design, Special Forces operate in small units.  The basic Special Forces 
element is the Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha (SFODA) or “A Team.”  In 
military terms, the SFODA is a combined arms team, meaning multiple capabilities are 
found within the unit.  Specifically, each twelve-man SFODA has two communications 
sergeants, two medical sergeants, two engineers and two weapons sergeants.  Based on 
the extensive training they receive in the Special Forces qualification course, each of 
these soldiers is considered an expert in their field.  Rounding out the team is an 
intelligence sergeant, an operations sergeant, a warrant officer and a captain who 
commands the detachment.  These Special Forces detachments are organized into 
companies and, in turn, battalions and groups.  Given the nature of Special Operations, 
however, most missions are planned and executed in a manner where the SFODA is 
                                                 
13 Department of the Army, Army Field Manual (FM) 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations, 2006, 1-8. 
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operating largely independent from a higher headquarters.  It is very possible that the 
SFODA could be the only representatives of the United States in a given area.  Consistent 
in any mission is the expectation that the SFODA will serve as a “force multiplier.”  In 
other words, ideal Special Forces operations are designed to enable the SFODA to apply 
their capabilities indirectly, working through a host nation or local forces.  In the 
unconventional warfare arena, “the primary role of SF is to advise, train, and assist 
indigenous military and paramilitary forces.”14  Due to the small size and limited 
logistical requirements, Special Forces teams are able to rapidly deploy, both 
domestically and during overseas combat operations.  Other similarly sized conventional 
Army units share this advantage, but do not possess the same combined arms capabilities 
or advanced skills as a Special Forces detachment.  
C. NATIONAL GUARD SPECIAL FORCES 
Fifteen states have Special Forces within their Army National Guard force 
structure.  Collectively, two entire Special Forces groups, fielding 108 SFODAs, reside 
within the Army National Guard.  National Guard soldiers serving in these units complete 
the same Special Forces qualification course as their active duty counterparts.  Like all 
National Guard units, Army National Guard Special Forces units assemble once a month 
for training.  Unlike other guard units, however, Special Forces generally require a 
greater time commitment from guardsmen.  For example, instead of a two-week annual 
training period, Guard Special Forces soldiers normally complete a three-week annual 
training period.  This annual training often takes place overseas while conducting real-
world missions to train military forces from allied or friendly nations.  Additionally, it is 
not uncommon for National Guard Special Forces to perform additional duty throughout 
the year in order to acquire or maintain language fluency, advanced skills such as military 
free-fall parachuting or military SCUBA courses, or to participate in training such as the 
Special Forces Advanced Urban Combat course.  Like all Special Forces, Army National 
                                                 
14 Department of the Army, Army Field Manual (FM) 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations, 2006, 1-
13.  
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Guard Special Forces units deploy in support of the Global War on Terror.  When not 
deployed, they remain under the command of their home state governor. 
D. CORE TASKS  
Seven core tasks constitute the basic functions of Special Forces.  Like most all 
other military doctrine, the core tasks below are framed purely in terms of combat 
operations and do not consider domestic operations.  Chapter VI details how some of 
these core tasks have potential homeland security applications. 
1. Unconventional Warfare (UW)  
UW is defined as “a broad range of military and or paramilitary operations and 
activities, normally of long duration, conducted through, with, or by indigenous or other 
surrogate forces that are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and otherwise directed 
in varying degrees by an external source.”15 UW operations can be conducted across the 
range of conflict against regular and irregular forces.  These forces may or may not be 
state sponsored.”16  The best contemporary example of UW performed by Special Forces 
is the initial stages of Operation Enduring Freedom.  Special Forces infiltrated into 
Afghanistan where they trained, advised and led Northern Alliance forces in defeating the 
Taliban.   
2. Foreign Internal Defense (FID)   
“FID is participation by civilian and military agencies of the government in any of 
the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free 
and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.”17  Current 
operations in Iraq constitute a FID mission, but also have overlapping elements of other 
core tasks.  More specifically, Special Forces are involved with organizing, training and 
mentoring Iraqi Special Operations elements.   
                                                 
15 Department of the Army, Army Field Manual (FM) 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations, 2006, 3-1.  
16 Ibid.  
17 Ibid.  
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3. Direct Action (DA) 
“DA operations are short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions 
conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments 
and that employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, 
recover, or damage designated targets.  DA differs from conventional offensive actions in 
the level of physical and political risk, operational techniques, and the degree of 
discriminate and precise use of force to achieve specific objectives.”18  Killing or 
capturing high-value terrorist in Iraq or Afghanistan would be considered a direct action 
mission.   
4. Special Reconnaissance (SR) 
“SR operations are reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a special 
operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify 
information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not 
normally found in conventional forces.  These actions provide an added capability for 
commanders and supplement other conventional reconnaissance and surveillance 
actions.”19  The most often cited SR mission is the use of Special Forces during the first 
Gulf War to monitor and report on Iraqi troop movements in the days prior to ground 
combat operations.   
5. Counterterrorism (CT)  
“CT is the full range of operations that include the offensive measures taken to 
prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism.  There are three categories of CT 
operations: hostage rescue, recovery of sensitive material from terrorist organizations, 
and attacks against terrorist infrastructure.”20 
 
                                                 
18 Department of the Army, Army Field Manual (FM) 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations, 2006. 
19 Ibid., 3-2.  
20 Ibid.  
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6. Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (CP)  
CP may involve the seizing of weapons of mass destruction at their origin, during 
transport or at any other time before employment.  This is a highly “specialized mission 
assigned to designated Special Operations Forces. Special Forces participation in CP is 
through the conduct of UW, SR, and DA.  Special Forces operational detachments 
designated in national and theater contingency plans to participate in CP may be specially 
task organized, trained, and equipped.  These designated Special Forces operational 
detachments respond as directed by the president, secretary of defense, or the geographic 
combatant commander to resolve specific situations arising from a proliferation incident.  
When a SFOD is tasked to perform a CP mission, it is strategic in nature.”21 
7. Support to Information Operations (SIO)   
“SF supports IO core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network 
operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in 
concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to affect or defend information 
and information systems, and to influence decision making.”22 
E. COLLATERAL ACTIVITIES 
Historically, in addition to the core tasks, Special Forces perform collateral 
activities, many which have homeland security applications.  The most recent version of 
Special Forces Operations, the principal doctrinal guidance for SF, omitted any 
discussion of collateral activities.23  Previous versions, as recent as June 2001, made it 
clear that the collateral activities discussed below were designed primarily for military 
operations other than war (MOOTW) and take advantage of the core competencies of 
Special Forces.  “SF units conduct collateral activities in MOOTW using these inherent 
capabilities in performing their primary missions.”24  The current version of Special 
                                                 
21 Department of the Army, Army Field Manual (FM) 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations, 2006. 
22 Ibid.  
23 Ibid. 
24 Department of the Army, Army Field Manual (FM) 3-05.30, Special Forces Operations, June 2001.  
 14
Forces Operations does not appear to limit SF missions to the core task.  Rather, this 
doctrinal change appears to reflect the contemporary operating environment and demands 
of the Global War on Terror (GWOT).  In other words, Special Forces are currently 
committed conducting GWOT missions related to their core tasks, and thus a doctrinal 
discussion of collateral activities is irrelevant.  Professors David Tucker and Christopher 
Lamb discuss this omission in their recent book, United States Special Operations 
Forces.25  In fact, Professors Tucker and Lamb suggest that the omission of collateral 
tasks relates to issues of supply and demand, and trace a trend toward expanding the 
domestic use Special Operations Forces prior to September 11, 2001.26  As previously 
noted, however, all military doctrine is active component oriented; National Guard 
Special Forces will be used, at a minimum, by governors for state homeland security 
operations — if not as a broader, regional response force.  Traditionally, Special Forces 
collateral activities included coalition support, combat search and rescue, counterdrug 
activities, humanitarian demining activities, foreign humanitarian assistance, security 
assistance and special activities.27  These same collateral activities are some of the most 
likely homeland security missions for Special Forces; whether active component or 
National Guard.  Chapter VI discusses how these collateral activities may be utilized in 
domestic operations. 
1. Coalition Support / Special Forces Liaison Element (SFLE) 
This mission is designed to improve “the interaction and interoperability of 
coalition partners and U.S. military forces” during combat operations.28  Special Forces 
are embedded with foreign armies in the combat theater and assist the coalition partner 
with communicating and synchronizing with adjacent U.S. forces.  “SF personnel are well-
suited for carrying out coalition support because of the skills they hone in the conduct of UW 
                                                 
25 David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2007, 164-168.  
26 Ibid., 165.  
27 Ibid.  
28 Department of the Army, Army Field Manual (FM) 3-05.30, Special Forces Operations, June 2001.  
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operations, and because of their regional orientation and cultural awareness.29   The Special 
Forces Liaison Elements “advise their foreign counterparts on U.S. military intentions and 
capabilities, provide training, provide global positioning system downlinks, and secure 
communications between the supported forces.”30 
2. Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) 
Combat Search and Rescue consists of “reporting, locating, identifying, and 
recovering and repatriating isolated personnel to friendly control.”31 During combat 
operations, Special Forces have the capability to conduct CSAR due to their expertise in the 
core SF tasks.32  Similarly, during homeland security operations, specifically DSCA events, 
Special Forces can provide teams to conduct search and rescue.  Since most all Army 
formations can conduct rudimentary search and rescue, SF are best utilized for missions 
requiring specialized skills, such as operating in a maritime environment in boats or 
subsurface (SCUBA), wilderness or mountainous terrain requiring mountaineering skills, or 
situations where rapid deployment of small teams with organic communications equipment is 
advantageous.   
3. Counterdrug Activities (CD) 
“CD activities are measures taken to detect, monitor, and counter the production, 
trafficking, and use of illegal drugs.”33  For Special Forces, this generally means training a 
foreign nations’ military, or police forces, on critical skills required to conduct small unit CD 
operations in order to stop narcotics at their source, or before they enter the United States.34  
In domestic operations, National Guard Special Forces may take a more direct role by 
conducting SR in support of civilian police narcotics investigations.  (see infra).   
                                                 
29 Department of the Army, Army Field Manual (FM) 3-05.30, Special Forces Operations, 2001. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid.  
32 Ibid.  
33 Ibid.  
34 Ibid.  
 16
4. Humanitarian Demining Activities (HD) 
Special Forces are sometimes employed to train host nation cadre in techniques to 
locate, identify, and destroy land mines and unexploded battlefield ordinance from 
previous conflicts.  The Special Forces core competencies of training and cross-cultural 
communications make SF a logical choice for this mission.  As previously noted, 
however, the operational demands of prosecuting the Global War on Terror have likely 
made this mission unfeasible for Special Forces. 
5. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (HA) 
Foreign HA involves the use of military “personnel, equipment, and supplies to 
promote human welfare; to reduce pain, suffering, and hardship; and to prevent loss of 
life or destruction of property from the aftermath of natural or man made disasters.”35  
Special Forces are “uniquely suited to render rapid, effective HA in remote areas, 
particularly in an uncertain or hostile environment.”36  Likewise, in the domestic realm, 
“ability to deploy on short notice to remote regions, familiarity with multi-agency 
operations, and limited logistics support requirements, all favor SF involvement in 
disaster relief operations.”37 
6. Security Assistance (SA) 
Security assistance missions are designed to enhance the capabilities of allied or 
friendly countries in order achieve U.S. goals in the particular area or region.  The 
primary role of SF is to provide mobile training teams and other forms of training 
assistance tailored to meet the specific requirements of the nation requesting the 
assistance.  The training provided by Special Forces may be to the host nation’s military, 
police or other governmental agency.  Training interagency partners, especially civilian 
law enforcement agencies, is the domestic, homeland security corollary to foreign  
 
                                                 
35 Department of the Army, Army Field Manual (FM) 3-05.30, Special Forces Operations, 2001. 
36 Ibid.  
37 Ibid.  
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security assistance missions.  Special Forces can train civilian law enforcement agencies 
in order to enhance their ability to prevent, disrupt and respond to terrorist and terrorist 
attacks.  
7. Special Activities (SA) 
SA missions are classified operations performed at the direction of the president, 
with congressional oversight.  Generally, the legal parameters are defined by Executive 
Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities.  “When directed by the President, the 
Department of Defense performs special activities during war declared by Congress or 
during any period covered by a Presidential report under the War Powers Act.”38 
F. SPECIAL FORCES EMPLOYMENT CRITERIA 
Special Operations Forces, including Army Special Forces, conduct two types of 
tasks.  “First, they perform tasks that no other forces in DoD conduct, and second, they 
perform tasks that are conducted by DoD forces, but do so to a unique set of conditions 
and standards.”39  Special Operations Forces are small in number and cannot be mass 
produced.   Considering the time and resources involved in producing special operators, 
mission criteria attempts to prevent the misuse of Special Operations Forces.  In short, the 
doctrinal criteria discussed below attempts to provide a checklist in order to assist 
commanders in determining if some other element rather than Special Forces should be 
conducting the mission.  If conventional forces possess the capability to conduct the 
mission, then the proposed mission is not generally considered appropriate for Special 
Forces.  Likewise, in order to avoid mission failure due to the assumption that Special 
Forces can do anything, the criteria attempts to force a realistic comprehension of the 
inherent limitations found in Special Forces units.  While the doctrinal mission criteria 
below are designed to evaluate proposed missions during combat operations, the 
framework is still applicable in homeland security scenarios.    
                                                 
38 Department of the Army, Army Field Manual (FM) 3-05.30, Special Forces Operations, 2001.  
39 Special Operations Forces Reference Manual, Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), Hurlburt 
Field, Florida: The JSOU Press, June 2005 (Revised July 2006), 1-3.  
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Criteria for Employing Special Forces   
Current military doctrine dictates specific criteria to evaluate if a mission is 
suitable, feasible and acceptable for Special Forces. 
1. Is this an appropriate mission for Special Forces?  In other words, does the 
proposed mission require Special Forces unique skills and abilities in order to produce 
the desired effect?  Normally, Special Forces are arrayed against vital strategic or 
operational targets.  “Commanders should not use Army Special Operations Forces as a 
substitute for other forces.”40 
2. Does the mission support the theater campaign plan?  “If the mission does 
not support the theater campaign plan, more appropriate missions are probably available 
for Army Special Operations Forces.”41 
3. Is the mission operationally feasible?  Is the proposed mission realistically 
within the capabilities of Special Forces?  “Army Special Forces are not structured for 
force on force warfare.  They should not assign missions that are beyond SOF 
capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities.”42 
4. Are the required resources available to conduct the mission?  Due to the 
small size of Special Forces units, some missions may require support from conventional 
forces. 
5. Does the expected outcome justify the risk?  Commanders must recognize 
the “high value and limited resources of Army Special Operations Forces.”43  These 
factors must be weighed against any proposed mission to ensure the potential strategic or 
operational gain is balanced against the risk of any proposed mission.  The risk may 
involve negative impact to U.S. diplomatic or political interest.44  
                                                 
40 Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations, 2006, 
1-14.  
41 Ibid.  
42 Ibid.  
43 Ibid.  
44 Ibid. 
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Employment Criteria Applied to Homeland Security Missions   
As the case studies below demonstrate, Army Special Forces, particularly 
National Guard Special Forces, will be employed in homeland security missions.  Like 
any military mission, therefore, the potential exists for the misuse of Special Forces.  The 
domestic use of military forces, especially in an armed role, is extremely politically 
sensitive.  Given that fact, a mission that would normally be assigned to a conventional 
force unit may be suitable for Special Forces.  However, considering the small size of 
Special Forces, performing routine security force missions is unrealistic.  Likewise, the 
limited resources found in Special Forces, especially in terms of vehicles, may render 
Special Forces unsuitable for certain homeland security missions.  Thus, as demonstrated 
below in the case studies, the employment of Special Forces in homeland security 
missions, like combat operations, should be limited to missions that require specialized 
capabilities, or missions undertaken in unique environments or where precise standards 












THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 21
III. CASE STUDIES — U.S. SPECIAL FORCES IN HOMELAND 
SECURITY OPERATIONS 
This chapter highlights two examples of Special Forces support to homeland 
security.  The first case study examines how the Florida Army National Guard uses 
Special Forces in domestic operations.  The second example, from Hurricane Katrina, 
describes what could be Special Forces’ finest hour in terms of domestic operations.  In 
each case study, the uses of Special Forces are analyzed and evaluated against the 
doctrinal employment criteria for Special Forces.   
A. FLORIDA ARMY NATIONAL GUARD HOMELAND SECURITY 
OPERATIONS. 
The Florida Army National Guard provides a good example of potential 
homeland security roles and missions for Special Forces.  The National Guard leadership 
in Florida utilizes its Army National Guard Special Forces for both domestic special 
reconnaissance missions and for training interagency law enforcement partners.    Florida 
also uses Special Forces to conduct search and rescue.  However, this case study will 
focus on special reconnaissance and training.  The Hurricane Katrina case study below 
describes search and rescue operations.   
Florida is the home to the 3rd Battalion, 20th Special Forces Group (Airborne).  
The Florida Army National Guard force structure contains the 3rd Battalion Headquarters, 
the Battalion Support Company and two Special Forces line companies.  Florida’s 
experience with hurricanes has required the National Guard to take an active role in civil 
support operations.  Florida also contends with floods, tropical storms, wildfires and 
other natural disasters requiring National Guard support.45  Additionally, like other states, 
Florida conducts National Guard counterdrug support operations.  Unlike other states, 
however, Florida executes a large part of their counterdrug support mission as a Special 
Forces operation. 
                                                 
45 Florida Division of Emergency Management.  http://www.floridadisaster.org/index.asp  (accessed 
December 2, 2007). 
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Consistent with doctrine for combat operations, during emergency or contingency 
operations, the Special Forces personnel are maintained as a strategic asset managed by 
the Florida National Guard Joint Force Headquarters, rather than assigned to a 
subordinate task force.46  Special reconnaissance is one of the primary missions assigned 
to SF by the Florida National Guard Joint Force Headquarters. 
1. Special Reconnaissance — The Rapid Impact Assessment Team 
Florida’s National Guard Special Forces are fully integrated into all-hazards 
planning through Florida Emergency Support Function (ESF) 13 – Military Support.  
Specifically, Florida’s ESF 13 directs the Florida Adjutant General to field Rapid Impact 
Assessment Teams (RIAT) in direct support of the Division of Emergency 
Management.47  “The RIAT teams deploy prior to a disaster, when possible, or 
immediately following a disaster.” 48    “The Rapid Impact Assessment Team (RIAT) 
concept was developed by the State of Florida in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew.”49  
Andrew stuck South Florida on August 24, 1992, and resulted in one of the worse natural 
disasters in U.S. history.50  “The mission of the RIAT team is to rapidly mobilize and 
deploy to a disaster area and jointly, with local officials, determine and report immediate 
victim needs (food, water, shelter, medical, security) and assess and report the associated 
loss of, or damage to supporting infrastructure (utilities, communications, transportation, 
medical facilities, emergency services) following a major or catastrophic disaster.”51  The 
RIAT mission is an interagency operation.  The actual mission is conducted under the 
authority of the Florida Department of Emergency Management.52  Team members come 
                                                 
46 John Pelleriti, Lieutenant Colonel, Assistant Operations Officer, J3, Florida National Guard Joint 
Force Headquarters.  Interview by author, December 3, 2007.  
47 Florida Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan 2004, Appendix XIII: Emergency Support 
Function 13 – Military Support.  February 1, 2004, 2.  
48 Ibid.  
49 Florida Army National Guard, Special Forces Missions.  
http://www.floridaguard.army.mil/careers/sf.aspx?id=46 (accessed December 3, 2007). 
50 Ibid.  
51 Ibid.    
52 Ibid.  
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from the Florida Army National Guard Special Forces Battalion and other governmental 
agencies.53  The Florida Special Forces soldiers excel at Defense Support to Civil 
Authorities in large part due to their abilities to build rapport in the interagency 
environment.54   For example, SF soldiers work hand in hand with the Florida State Fire 
Marshal’s office — specifically, personnel from the State Bureau of Fire Prevention — 
when assigned to RIAT teams.55  “Upon activation, these personnel report to a pre-
designated staging area and report to a team leader from the Florida National Guard” (SF 
Personnel).56   The interagency RIAT responsibilities of the fire marshal’s personnel 
include “assessing and evaluating the status of emergency services such as fire apparatus, 
fire stations and facilities, personnel and needs assessment associated with the fire service 
in a stricken area.”57 The fire marshal personnel anticipate deployments of up to 96 hours 
in length.”58  “The ability of Special Forces personnel to rapidly deploy by aircraft or 
other means is the key to accomplishing the RIAT mission.”59 “Special Forces personnel 
employ high-frequency and satellite communications devices to establish and maintain 
communication during the mission.”60 “This allows the rapid, “real time” reporting on 
the ground conditions at the disaster or emergency site.”61  In addition to the 
communications specialist found on a Special Forces detachment, the engineers and 
medics can also provide expertise to the interagency venture.  Likewise, the overall 
capabilities of the Special Forces detachment provide security for the collective RIAT 
team during contingency and emergency operations.   
                                                 
53 Florida Army National Guard, Special Forces Missions.   
54 Pelleriti, Interview by author, December 3, 2007.  
55 Florida State Fire Marshal.  http://www.fldfs.com/sfm/esf/esf49.htm (accessed December 3, 2007). 
56 Ibid.  
57 Ibid.  
58 Ibid.  
59  Florida Army National Guard, Special Forces Missions.  
http://www.floridaguard.army.mil/careers/sf.aspx?id=46 (accessed December 3, 2007). 
60 Ibid.  
61 Ibid.  
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2. Exemplar — Hurricane Charley — August 9-14, 2004 
Hurricane Charley struck the Southwest coast of Florida as a category 4 hurricane 
on August 13, 2004. 62  “The hurricane traversed the Florida peninsula, resulting in a 
swath of destruction across the state.”63  Charley’s 75 knot winds caused an estimated 
$6.755 billion in damages in Florida.64  At least nine people in Florida died as a direct 
result of Hurricane Charley, in addition to another twenty deaths in Florida indirectly 
caused by the hurricane.65 This was the worst hurricane to hit Florida since Hurricane 
Andrew in 1992.66  By 7:00 a.m. on the morning of August 14, a RIAT team under the 
leadership of National Guard Special Forces, and consisting of state interagency 
communications officials and others deployed to the impact area in Charlotte County, 
Florida, to assess the severity of Charley’s impact. 67  In Charlotte County alone, four fire 
stations were destroyed; three hospitals were knocked out of service, while two airport 
hangers, the county emergency operations center and two shelters were destroyed.68  Five 
additional reconnaissance teams comprised of National Guard Special Forces soldiers 
deployed in the aftermath of Charley.69   
 
                                                 
62 Richard J. Pasch, Daniel P. Brown, and Eric S. Blake, National Weather Service, National 
Hurricane Center Tropical Cyclone Report. Hurricane Charley. October 18, 2004, Revised  January 5, 
2005.  
63 Ibid.  
64 Ibid.  
65 Ibid.  
66 Ibid.  
67 Hurricane Charley Situation Report # 7. Florida State Emergency Response Team, State Operations 
Center, August 14, 2004, and State Operations Center Briefing Slides, August 13, 2004.  
68 Ibid.  
69 Ibid.  
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3. Special Reconnaissance — The Counterdrug Operational Detachment 
Alpha  
Each state’s National Guard is congressionally authorized to provide counterdrug 
support to civilian law enforcement agencies.70  This program “provides skilled 
personnel, specialized equipment, and facilities to support law enforcement agencies and 
community-based programs in response to the drug threat.”71   
At least two of the program areas within the counterdrug program are ideally 
suited for Special Forces: Reconnaissance/Observation and Subsurface/Diver Support.  
The reconnaissance mission involves  
observation by land or water to detect and report illegal drug activities that 
include, but are not limited to, cultivating marijuana, suspected isolated 
drug trafficking airstrips, drug drop zones, drug trafficking corridors, 
illegal laboratories, suspicious aircraft, watercraft or motor vehicles.72   
Since successful reconnaissance and/or observation is often dependant on 
concealment, many of the tactics, techniques and procedures employed in Special Forces 
Special Reconnaissance missions are used in this program.  The ability to report the 
activity at the target site is a critical component of both SF Special Reconnaissance 
missions and the counterdrug ground reconnaissance program.  Similarly, the 
Subsurface/Diver Support mission is designed to conduct “inspections of commercial 
vessel hulls within the U.S. territorial waters or U.S. maritime ports of entry (POE) 
through the use of sidescan radar or divers to detect alien devices or containers attached 
to the vessel hulls, or other underwater activities.”73   Since Special Forces units include 
combat divers, it was only logical for Florida to turn to Special Forces to conduct this 
underwater special reconnaissance mission.   
                                                 
70 32 USC 112.  
71 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Counterdrug Operations, Joint Publication 3-07.4. (Washington, DC: 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 13, 2007), II-19 [Publication on-line]; available from 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jpoperationsseriespubs.htm (accessed  December 1, 2007).  
72 National Guard Bureau, National Guard Counterdrug Support, National Guard Regulation 500-
2/Air National Guard Instruction 10-801 (Arlington, VA: Secretaries of the Army and Air Force), 10 
http://www.ngbpdc.ngb.army.mil/pubs/500/ngr500_2.pdf (accessed  December 1, 2007). 
73 Ibid.  
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The Florida National Guard apparently has recognized these critical similarities 
and has organized their counterdrug reconnaissance and dive program around a 
“Counterdrug Operational Detachment Alpha,” mirroring the standard configuration of a 
SF Detachment.74  This unit is made up of Special Forces soldiers, who volunteer for 
full-time National Guard duty in addition to their traditional National Guard unit 
requirements.75 
Florida’s Counterdrug Operational Detachment Alpha (CDODA) has conducted 
successful dive operations in support of civilian law enforcement since 1990.76  For 
example, in December 2005, members of the Florida National Guard CDODA conducted 
a week-long dive operation in support of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
Agency.  The mission was to search “cruise and cargo ships’ bottoms for parasitic 
devices used to transport illegal drugs into the United States.”77  The counterdrug dive 
operation was an interagency operation that allowed the SF soldiers to work with 
Customs and Border Protection, the Florida Fish and Wildlife Commission and Miami 
Dade firefighters.78   
4. Training — Counderdrug Training Academy 
Florida’s Special Forces soldiers also conduct training for civilian law 
enforcement training under the auspices of the counterdrug program. As previously 
discussed, training other military, paramilitary or law enforcement agencies is a core 
competency of Special Forces.  The curriculum is “designed to teach military skills to 
law enforcement officers so that they may more safely and efficiently conduct 
                                                 
74 Shawn Keen, Master Sergeant, Detachment Operations Sergeant, Counter Drug Operational 
Detachment Alpha, Florida National Guard Joint Force Headquarters.  Interview by author, December 4, 
2007.  
75 Keen, Interview. 
76 National Guard Bureau, The Catalyst, Second Quarter 2006 (Arlington, VA: Secretaries of the 
Army and Air Force).   
77 Ibid.     
78 Ibid.  
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counterdrug operations in demanding rural environments.”79  The training academy is 
located at the Camp Blanding Military Reservation.  Camp Blanding is a state-owned 
military facility encompassing 72,000 acres in Northeast Florida.80  The training courses 
currently conducted by the Florida Counterdrug Training Academy include:81  
Tactical Three-Gun Marksmanship.  During a five-day program, police officers 
receive instruction on pistol, shotgun and carbine marksmanship.  This course is designed 
for SWAT officers, but is open to all law enforcement officers. The training includes both 
classroom instruction and live-fire ranges.   
Rural Operations.  This course is conducted in either a “basic” or “advanced” 
format and is designed for law enforcement officers working in rural environments.  The 
rural operations course includes training in land navigation, tracking and countertracking, 
booby traps, camouflage, movement techniques and mission planning.  The course 
concludes with a practical exercise in the field.   
Maritime Operations.  Designed to teach law enforcement officers to conduct 
operations on or in maritime environments, this course is conducted over a five-day 
period.  Class subjects include: Zodiac boat driving, beach landings, water survival, 
surface swimming, maritime hazards, harbor surveillance, and helo-cast operations.   
Tactical Medic.  “This course is specifically designed for EMTs or paramedics 
assigned or attached to tactical teams.” The instruction includes combat casualty care, 
field medicine, medical evacuation, tourniquets, and decompression. 
 
 
                                                 
79 Florida National Guard Counterdrug Training Academy, “Course Descriptions,” available from 
http://www.floridacounterdrug.com/fcta/fcta_home.htm (accessed December 3, 2007).  
80 Florida National Guard, Training Sites.  Available from 
http://www.floridaguard.army.mil/read.asp?did=539 (accessed December 3, 2007).  
81 Florida National Guard, Florida Counterdrug Training Academy.  
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In addition to the standard courses discussed above, the Florida Counterdrug 
Training Academy offers custom-designed courses for law enforcement agencies.82    
Like all other aspects of the counterdrug program, a nexus must exist between the 
training and narcotics enforcement.83   
5. Analysis 
This case study demonstrates a limited, but almost ideal usage of Special Forces 
in domestic operations.  The Florida National Guard’s pattern and practice adheres 
closely to Army doctrine, despite the dearth of specific domestic operational doctrine.  
When employed, the Special Forces are used in a manner that parallels and complements 
their wartime missions.  These tasks do not drain precious resources or training time 
away from training for wartime or federal missions.  Florida utilizes Special Forces in 
operations playing to the strengths of Special Forces.  Not only does the Florida National 
Guard employ Special Forces to conduct the core SF task of special reconnaissance, but, 
by maintaining control of their Special Forces elements at the Joint Force Headquarters 
level, they ensure this versatile asset is engaged at the strategic or operational level of 
domestic operations as intended.  Likewise, leveraging Special Forces to conduct training 
of interagency law enforcement partners takes advantage of a core competency of Special 
Forces.  The training curriculum exploits the skills and capabilities of Special Forces 
soldiers.    For example, all SF soldiers have significant experience operating in rural 
environments prior to graduating from the Special Forces Qualification Course.  Special 
Forces weapons sergeants are trained to be proficient in small arms used in this training 
program.  Likewise, Special Forces combat divers are adept at conducting the skills 
covered in the maritime operations course, and Special Forces medical sergeants possess 
the skills required to instruct the tactical medic course.  Further, by training interagency 
law enforcement partners, Florida not only enhances interagency relationships, but they  
 
 
                                                 
82 Florida National Guard Counterdrug Training Academy, “Course Descriptions.”  
83 32 USC 112.  
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serve to multiply the overall state homeland security capabilities.  This training role may 
have the additional benefit of minimizing the necessity of using National Guard forces in 
a law enforcement role.   
6. Special Forces Employment Criteria   
While the doctrinal employment criteria is designed to evaluate potential wartime 
combat operations, an examination of Florida’s use of Special Forces may still be helpful 
in determining the proper roles and missions for Special Forces in domestic operations.  
The evaluation below discusses each of the five employment criteria for Special Forces. 
Is this an appropriate mission for Special Forces?  In other words, does the 
proposed mission require Special Forces unique skills and abilities in order to 
produce the desired effect?   
• As discussed herein, Special Forces are ideally suited for the missions 
assigned by the Florida National Guard.  The SF soldiers bring a rapid 
response and specialized skills sets that complement interagency partners.  
The familiarization with interagency environments, and emphasis on 
rapport building found in Special Forces, enable these domestic missions.  
In addition, since training others is a core capability for Special Forces, 
they are ideally suited to conduct training for law enforcement agencies.  
This training may save lives or, at a minimum, enhance interagency 
operations during actual times of crisis. 
Does the mission support the theater campaign plan? 
• Florida’s use of Special Forces to conduct special reconnaissance in 
emergency and contingency operations is in support of the Florida 
Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan.  Likewise, federal law 
requires governors submit an annual state drug interdiction and 
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counterdrug activities plan before any federal funds may be used to place 
National Guard service members on counterdrug duty.84 
Is the mission operationally feasible?  Is the proposed mission realistically 
within the capabilities of Special Forces?   
• In the case at hand, assuming the SF battalion is not deployed for an 
overseas, federal mission, the Florida Special Forces units have the 
capability to accomplish special reconnaissance during most emergency 
and contingency operations.    Given a weapon of mass destruction 
(WMD) event, a more technical reconnaissance would be required from 
the state’s National Guard Civil Support Team.85  Both the counterdrug 
and training missions require SF personnel willing to volunteer to perform 
full-time National Guard duty.  With these limitations in mind, it is fair to 
say that the domestic missions contemplated here are feasible for Special 
Forces.   
Are the required resources available to conduct the mission? 
• With the exception of vehicles, the organic equipment normally assigned 
to a Special Forces company is sufficient to undertake most domestic 
special reconnaissance missions.  Tactical, high-mobility vehicles may be 
required for some missions.  While not organic to a Special Forces 
company, these vehicles are found at the Special Forces battalion level.  
In any event, these could be temporarily allocated from another National 
Guard unit if unavailable to Special Forces.  Experience has shown, 
however, during some maritime operations, normal watercraft assigned to 
Special Forces is inadequate.  Florida has augmented the rubber tactical  
 
                                                 
84 32 USC 112(C).  
85 For information on the National Guard Civil Support Team, See: 
http://www.ngb.army.mil/features/HomelandDefense/cst/factsheet.html (accessed December 3, 2007). 
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boats normally found in Special Forces units with metal rescue boats.  
The rubber boats often became damaged operating in post-hurricane, 
flooded urban environments.86 
Does the expected outcome justify the risk? 
• Special Reconnaissance conducted during emergency or contingency 
operations potentially save lives and property.  Further damage and 
suffering can be mitigated through an efficient government response.  This 
response is dependent on accurate information regarding the situation on 
the ground.  Special Forces fill this function in Florida.  The acceptability 
of National Guard soldiers performing special reconnaissance in direct 
support of civilian law enforcement’s efforts to suppress illegal drugs is at 
least debatable.  All governors are required to submit an annual plan 
describing their National Guard Counterdrug operation.87  Presumably the 
governor of Florida has identified and accepted the associated risk of 
National Guard soldiers providing direct support to law enforcement.  In 
fact, since a majority of states perform this specific National Guard 
counterdrug function, it is arguable that Florida, by using Special Forces 
professionals, has a lower residual risk than other states.   None of the 
domestic operations discussed can interfere with combat readiness, since 
all of the Special Forces soldiers performing domestic support missions 
are subject to being deployed overseas for federal service.88 
B. SPECIAL FORCES TASK FORCE — HURRICANE KATRINA 
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina slammed into Louisiana, and later 
Mississippi, with winds upward of 130 miles per hour.  The resulting catastrophe killed 
                                                 
86 Richard Hall, Major, Executive Officer, 3rd Battalion, 20th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Florida 
Army National Guard.  Interview by author, December 4, 2007.  
87 32 USC 112(a).  
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over thirteen thousand people, flooded New Orleans and was the most destructive natural 
disaster in American history.89    By September 9, over forty-one thousand National 
Guard troops from forty-five states, the District of Columbia, the Virgin Islands, and 
Puerto Rico were operating in Mississippi and Louisiana.90  This unprecedented National 
Guard response included a relatively diminutive portion of Special Forces that performed 
some of the most critical tasks, making a momentous impact during the response and 
recovery operations.  Special Forces units from Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, 
California, Utah and Colorado all deployed to the region on the orders of their home state 
governor, through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC).  Initially  
they were ordered to State Active Duty (SAD).  Later, on September 7, 2005, the 
Department of Defense authorized National Guard forces to be placed into Title 32 status, 
retroactive to August 29.91      
Mississippi is the home of 2nd Battalion, 20th Special Forces Group (Airborne).  
At the time Katrina hit, the unit was conducting its final preparations to mobilize in 
September for an overseas deployment.   A minimum of two SF detachments from C 
Company, 2nd Battalion, 20th SFG(A), MSARNG responded to provide immediate relief 
in Southern Mississippi.92  The composite teams were equipped with rubber inflatable  
boats and satellite communications systems.  An additional cell, comprised primarily of 
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emergency operations center.93  After approximately ten days, the Mississippi Special 
Forces soldiers were released to return home in order to make final preparations for their 
deployment.94  
Less than twenty-four hours after Katrina made landfall, the Alabama National 
Guard deployed approximately seventy-five Special Forces Soldiers to Alabama’s Gulf 
Coast, equipped with agile inflatable boats.95  This force helped rescue people on the 
coast, but was soon diverted to help search for victims in New Orleans.96   
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger ordered California National Guard elements, 
including a Special Forces detachment from the 19th Special Forces Group, to assist New 
Orleans on September 1, 2005.97  Likewise, the governor of Utah sent Special Forces 
soldiers from the 19th Special Forces based in Utah to New Orleans.98    
Eventually, all of these Special Forces units formed an adhoc Special Forces Task 
Force under the leadership of the Florida National Guard’s 3rd Battalion, 20th Special 
Forces Group (Airborne).  The Florida-based Special Forces unit received a warning 
order from state headquarters on August 27, 2005.99  This warning order placed the 
Special Forces on alert for support operations including the Florida RIAT mission.  The 
following day, they received the final execution order.100  On August 29, the same day 
Katrina made landfall, nineteen SF soldiers departed Florida.101  Initially, the Florida 
Special Forces element conducted search and rescue operations in Biloxi, Mississippi, on 
August 30 and 31.102  On September 1, the unit received orders to deploy to Belle Chase 
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Naval Air Station in New Orleans to conduct search and rescue operations.103 While en-
route to New Orleans, the 20th Group Headquarters in Alabama informed the Florida 
battalion commander that he would be taking charge of all 20th Group elements in New 
Orleans.104  In fact, the taskforce eventually was comprised of elements from both the 
Army National Guard Special Forces 19th Group and 20th Group. 105  The Florida Special 
Forces element arrived in New Orleans on the night of September 1, 2005, established an 
operations center at Harrah’s Casino and consolidated elements attached from other 
states.106    
1. Search and Rescue Operations in New Orleans 
Once in New Orleans, the lead elements of the Special Forces Task Force 
immediately made contact with the remnants of the New Orleans Police Department 
(NOPD).  The SF soldiers apprised the NOPD of their maritime capabilities and simply 
asked, “How can we help you?”107  This initial positive contact with the civilian 
authorities likely set the tone for a very successful working relationship during the course 
of operations in New Orleans.  By the morning of September 2, 2005, the Special Forces 
Task Force was conducting joint search and rescue operations on the water with the 
NOPD.108  One NOPD officer, wherever possible, joined in with a team of Special 
Forces soldiers in their boats.109  Others teams conducted ground operations using high-
mobility vehicles to conduct search and rescue operations.110  Once again, depending 
upon availability, NOPD officers accompanied the Special Forces Soldiers. During the 
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first day alone, the Special Forces rescued 803 people.111  That same day, the Special 
Forces Task Force made contact with active component Army helicopters from Fort 
Hood and U.S. Air Force Special Operations units.112  Using these relationships, SF 
teams began conducting air operations on September 3, in addition to ongoing ground 
and water operations.113  The SF soldiers would fly on Blackhawk helicopters to groups 
of stranded citizens.114  In most cases, the helicopters could not land due to the crush of 
people rushing the aircraft.115  The SF soldiers would disembark while the helicopter 
took off and orbited overhead.116  The SF soldiers would calm and organize the people 
into serials to board the aircraft.117  Once they had the landing zone secure, the SF 
soldiers would radio the aircraft to return and begin loading.118  The Special Forces Task 
Forces combined ground, air and water operations rescued over a four thousand civilians 







2 SEP 803 0 803 
3 SEP 500 1030 1530 
4 SEP 795 258 1053 
5 SEP 649 37 686 
6 SEP 105 7 112 
7 SEP 18 1 19 
8 SEP 4 0 4 
TOTALS 2874 1333 4207 
Table 1.   Summary of Special Forces Task Force Search and Rescue Operations 
 in New Orleans. 
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2. Coalition Support/Special Forces Liaison Element—Law 
Enforcement Coordination 
In addition to the immediate life-saving search and rescue operations, one of the 
most significant but unsung roles played by the Special Forces Task Force was 
organizing and running the law enforcement operations center in downtown New 
Orleans.  Located at Harrah’s Casino in downtown New Orleans, the law enforcement 
operations center provided direction and unity of purpose for the multitude of state and 
local law enforcement agencies pouring into New Orleans.  Since many state and local 
law enforcement agencies self deployed, the exact figures of law enforcement agencies 
supporting operations in New Orleans may never be known.120  In Louisiana, 27,727 
personnel deployed through the EMAC process alone.121  For example, the New York 
Police Department sent more than three hundred officers, the New York State Police sent 
more than one hundred officers and the New York Department of Corrections sent more 
than two hundred and fifty officers.122  This is in addition to the hundreds of FBI, ATF, 
DEA, U.S. Marshals Service, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Customs 
and Border Patrol, and Bureau of Prisons officers and agents who deployed to New 
Orleans.123  Absent amid this crush of dedicated and well-intentioned law enforcement 
was a lack of any organization or command and control.  The New Orleans Police 
Department collapsed and, therefore, these out-of-town peace officers had no 
organization, sectors or divisions to rely on.124  Thus, the state and local law enforcement 
arriving into New Orleans were not tied into any organized plan with a specific task or 
purpose.  As a result, law enforcement agencies from outside jurisdictions lacked any 
situational awareness of where they were most needed.  During their initial search and 
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rescue operations, the Special Forces soldiers encountered various law enforcement 
agencies that were not seemingly operating with a specific task or purpose.125  
Recognizing this fact, the Special Forces soldiers, who were already tied in with at least 
part of the New Orleans Police Department, started spreading the word to the various law 
enforcement agencies they encountered to report to Harrah’s Casino to be effectively 
incorporated into the response and recovery plan.126  This unilateral initiative brought 
order to a theretofore disorganized, disjointed operation.  The word spread quickly, and 
Harrah’s became the operations center for law enforcement.127  “Local, state and federal 
law enforcement working in New Orleans began 9:00 a.m. meetings at Harrah’s.”128  
“These meetings enabled the law enforcement entities to meet face to face and coordinate 
critical missions.”129  The Special Forces Task Force coordinated with the USS Iwo Jima 
to receive satellite images and graphics once it arrived in the Port of New Orleans.130  
Using these products, the Special Forces Task Force, in coordination with the NOPD, 
divided the city into operational sectors.131  Each morning, a small Special Forces 
element, with NOPD representatives, would conduct an aerial reconnaissance of the city 
and identify sectors of immediate concern.132  Later, at the morning meeting, law 
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enforcement agencies would receive an assigned sector to patrol or a specific mission.133  
This coordination included linking up the supporting law enforcement agency with a 
NOPD officer, if possible.134  Seeing the criticality of the law enforcement operations 
center, other organizations and support organizations eventually co-located at Harrah’s, 
which further enhanced its contribution to interagency operations and effectiveness.            
3. Security Operations 
While not part of the Special Forces Task Force, the security operations 
performed by Colorado’s Special Forces deserve mention.  Approximately two hundred 
soldiers from Colorado’s 5th Battalion, 19th Special Forces Group (Airborne) deployed to 
New Orleans in October and November 2005.135  The battalion headquarters, battalion 
support company, and two line companies traveled from Colorado to New Orleans and 
back again via buses.136  Excluding the time on the road, the unit spent thirty days on the 
ground.137  By that time, military operations in the city were divided into eight districts, 
with an Army National Guard battalion assigned to each district.138   Once on the ground, 
the Colorado Special Forces battalion received the mission to patrol the Algiers 
neighborhood, along with the New Orleans Police Department.139   
4. Analysis 
The actions of the Special Forces Task Force during Hurricane Katrina illustrate 
many of the characteristics of Special Operations and core competencies of Special 
Forces.  The operations centered around conducting the core task of Special 
Reconnaissance and collateral activities of Search and Rescue and Coalition Support / 
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Special Forces Liaison Element.  The ability to quickly build rapport with civilian law 
enforcement was essential to the Special Forces Task Force’s success.  Finally, the 
Special Forces inherent small-team organization and capabilities — including security, 
communications and emergency medicine — served to multiply the success of the task 
force.  The core competencies of problem solving, interpersonal skills, facilitating 
interagency operations, and operating in an austere environment are all present in this 
case study. 
Problem Solving.  The SF soldiers arrived in New Orleans to a very ambiguous 
situation.  Most National Guard troops dispatched to Louisiana did not know what the 
mission would be or where it would be performed until they arrived.140  Additionally, 
since the conventional National Guard forces responded from many other states, 
command and control, unity of purpose and situational awareness were lacking during the 
first several days of the operation.  According to the Task Force Deputy Commander, the 
Special Forces were “largely successful due to the ability to execute (operations) in the 
absence of guidance or orders.”141  The task force determined what needed to be done 
and simply began conducting operations. 
Interpersonal Skills.  The Special Forces soldiers were probably successful in 
large measure due to their interpersonal skills.  Drawing on the core competency of 
interpersonal skills and experiences working with host nation and indigenous forces 
around the world, they set the conditions for a productive relationship with the NOPD 
during their first encounter.  Similarly, they effectively coordinated to receive helicopter 
support from an active duty aviation unit.  Most significantly, they influenced the course 
of all law enforcement operations within New Orleans with the establishment of the law 
enforcement operations center.  Obviously this feat took considerable interpersonal skills.  
This ability to persuade others is a large part of what makes SF soldiers unique and is 
difficult to inventory.  This ability stems in part from the respect associated with being an 
elite soldier, partly due to maturity, and finally the professional demeanor ingrained in 
Special Forces.     
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Interagency and Joint Operations.  The Special Forces Task Force immediately 
facilitated interagency operations with the NOPD.  They quickly established rapport and 
let the NOPD know they were there to assist, not direct or control.  Further, they built on 
this success and eventually incorporated all state, local and federal law enforcement to 
their operations via the law enforcement operations center.  Likewise, the SF soldiers 
quickly and effectively established working relationships with Air Force, active duty 
Army aviation elements, and the U.S. Navy in order to maximize their capabilities.   
Austere Environments.  Operating in austere environments for extended periods, 
with little external support, is a hallmark of Special Forces operations.  New Orleans lost 
all power and running water as a result of Katrina.  During operations in New Orleans, 
the Special Forces Task Force operated in the water, on land and off airborne platforms in 
order to accomplish the mission.     
5. Special Forces Employment Criteria   
Is this an appropriate mission for Special Forces?  In other words, does the 
proposed mission require Special Forces unique skills and abilities in order to 
produce the desired effect?   
• SR/Search and Rescue and Coalition Support.  Other elements and units of 
the Department of Defense and state and local governments can conduct 
search and rescue.  In fact, many other agencies did so in New Orleans.  
This was still an appropriate mission for Special Forces, however, given 
their maritime capabilities.  Equally important is the ability to operate in 
ambiguous situations and to quickly size up the situation and set about 
producing results.  Since military forces are generally not the lead in any 
domestic operations, Special Forces can play a unique role in developing 
and maintaining interagency relationships with civilian authorities, such as 
demonstrated in their establishment of the law enforcement coordination 




Special Forces, this type of interagency coordination serves as a force 
multiplier synchronizing law enforcement agencies into an overall 
response strategy.    
• Security Operations.  By the time the Colorado-based Special Forces 
Battalion Headquarters and associated subordinate units arrived in New 
Orleans in October, rescue operations were concluded.  The battalion’s 
task was to conduct security operations in a given sector of the city.  
Adjacent units performing the same task were conventional Army 
National Guard battalions.  This mission did not require unique skills or 
capabilities, and thus was not appropriate for Special Forces.   
Does the mission support the theater campaign plan? 
• In short, there was no coherent campaign plan, which compounded the 
response effort.  However, the National Guard Bureau’s request for the 
states to deploy forces was designed to “mitigate the loss of life and limb 
in support of Louisiana and Mississippi.”142  As previously stated, absent 
more specific guidance, Special Forces will develop a plan and execute 
operations.  In the present case, this resulted in saving over four thousand 
lives.   
Is the mission operationally feasible?  Is the proposed mission realistically 
within the capabilities of Special Forces?   
• All of the missions conducted by the Special Forces Task Force were 
feasible and within the capabilities of the units.  It is important to note, 
however, that the search and rescue operations were not the only ones 
being conducted.  Special Forces did not rescue all of the people trapped 
in New Orleans; rather, they used their unique skills and abilities to  
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operate on the water and in the air.  Additionally, their rapport and 
organization skills enhanced the overall effectiveness of the interagency 
operation. 
Are the required resources available to conduct the mission? 
• As with all disasters, more of everything is immediately needed.  No doubt 
the Special Forces Task Force could have benefited from more boats and 
vehicles.  However, the ability for Special Forces to rapidly conduct 
similar search and rescue operations during a future major emergency will 
be more likely limited by rapid deployment capabilities.  Alabama and 
Florida, since they were relatively geographically close, were able to come  
to the aid of New Orleans fairly rapidly.  A similar event may require 
rapid air and ground transportation resources in order to rapidly move 
Special Forces into the disaster zone.     
Does the expected outcome justify the risk? 
• Evaluating this criterion is dependant on the particular circumstances.  
Rescue workers such as fire fighters employ risk analysis to determine if 
the specific environmental factors present are sufficiently high enough to 
postpone or cancel search and rescue operations.  In some cases, the 
danger of searching for unknown but possible survivors is outweighed by 
danger to the rescue force.  Special Forces commanders are trained to 
conduct a risk assessment prior to all operations; search and rescue 
operations are no exception.   
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IV. LEGAL AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
This chapter contemplates legal and policy considerations for domestic homeland 
security missions involving Special Forces.  Specifically, constraints on conducting 
interagency training and operations with civilian law enforcement and intelligence 
oversight restrictions are briefly described.  Furthermore, the unique nature of the 
constitutionally mandated National Guard is discussed in order to analyze the potential 
ability of Army National Guard Special Forces to better support homeland security 
operations.  
A. LEGAL AND POLICY RESTRICTIONS 
1. Restriction on Providing Advanced Military Training to Civilian Law 
Enforcement   
Military personnel and units are permitted to provide training in basic military 
skills to civilian law enforcement agencies.143   However, Department of Defense policy 
prohibits providing advanced training to civilian law enforcement agencies.144  
“Advanced military training is defined as high-intensity training which focuses on the 
tactics, techniques and procedures required to apprehend, arrest detain, search for, or 
seize a criminal suspect when the potential for violent confrontation exists.”145  
Generally, this does not include skills military personnel learn during basic training, such 
as basic rifle marksmanship, conducting patrols, planning missions, first aid and survival 
skills.  It does include training in close quarters battle, sniper training, other advanced 
marksmanship skills and conducting operations in urban areas.146  On an exceptional 
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basis, the commander of U.S. Special Operations Command may approve advanced 
military training provided by Special Operations Forces to civilian law enforcement 
agencies.147  This restriction is “based on prudent concerns that advanced training could 
be misapplied or misused by civilian law enforcement agencies, resulting in death or 
injury to non-hostile persons.”148  This constraint, however, seemingly does not impact 
the ability of military forces to provide training on specific equipment.  Federal law 
stipulates that the military personnel may provide training on the operation and 
maintenance of equipment to civilian law enforcement agencies.149    
2. Restriction on Providing Expert Advice  
Federal law permits military personnel to provide expert advice to civilian law 
enforcement agencies.150  However, this law is further modified by Department of 
Defense policy limiting expert advice to irregular, indirect involvement in civilian law 
enforcement matters.151  Thus, this policy prohibition could limit the ability of Army 
Special Forces to provide advice and recommendations during interagency homeland 
security planning, exercises or operations.  As discussed below, the National Guard is a 
dual status organization.  When operating in its state status, with state funding, the 
Department of Defense restrictions on training and expert advice are arguably, at a 
minimum, inapplicable if not unconstitutional.     
3. Restriction on Direct Participation or Direct Assistance in Civilian 
Law Enforcement Operations    
Simplified, the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) prohibits the direct involvement of 
U.S. Army and Air Force personnel in civilian law enforcement.152  This prohibition is 
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further expanded to the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps through Department of Defense 
policy.153  The PCA prohibits federal military personnel from executing the laws of the 
United States and providing direct assistance to law enforcement agencies.  Prohibited 
direct assistance to civilian law enforcement agencies includes interdiction, search and 
seizure, arresting or apprehending, and surveillance or pursuit of suspects.154  Several 
exceptions to the PCA exist in federal law.  The most notable is the insurrection 
statutes.155  This set of laws provides the president the ability to use the military to 
restore order in situations involving insurgency, domestic violence, or conspiracies to 
thwart state or federal law enforcement.156  Whether a terrorist attack would trigger such 
an extreme response will likely be dependent on the severity and duration of the attack, 
and would be politically sensitive.  Other statutory exceptions include actions related to 
prohibited transactions of nuclear material, emergency situations involving chemical or 
biological weapons of mass destruction, protecting the president, vice president, members 
of Congress and other dignitaries, and protecting national parks and other federal 
property.157  
Two important observations must be made regarding the PCA.  First, the nature of 
asymmetrical warfare muddies the distinction between homeland defense and law 
enforcement actions.  For example, an invasion of the United States by a foreign military 
is very clearly not a law enforcement matter.  However, a sustained, dispersed terrorism 
campaign involving improvised explosive devices is less clear cut.  Locating and 
capturing the clandestine terrorist cells could be considered either a homeland defense 
operation conducted the Department of Defense or a law enforcement operation led by 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation.  Further complicating this scenario is the reality that 
recent criticism and legal challenges — over operations at Guantanamo Bay, domestic 
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wire tapping by the National Security Agency and related actions — have seemingly 
restricted the president’s presumptive authority as Commander in Chief under Article II 
of the Constitution.  Thus, in the event of future domestic terrorist attacks, if it is 
considered a law enforcement action, all of the provisions of the PCA would apply to 
limit the military’s ability to conduct domestic homeland defense operations.  Secondly, 
the National Guard is not subject to the PCA when operating in either Title 32 or State 
Active Duty (SAD) status.158  In its constitutionally mandated role as the state militia, the 
National Guard is not considered to be federal troops.159  This flexibility could be a 
significant factor against federalizing National Guard forces.   If authorized by state law, 
National Guard forces, including Army National Guard Special Forces can, in extreme 
situations, undertake law enforcement operations.  More probable, Army National Guard 
Special Forces could provide direct assistance to civilian law enforcement.  For example, 
during an ongoing domestic terrorism campaign, civilian law enforcement will likely be 
stretched to capacity.  Army National Guard Special Forces operating in state status could 
utilize their special reconnaissance skills to assist in the surveillance of suspected 
terrorists groups.        
4. Restriction on Collecting Information Concerning U.S. Persons   
In order to protect Constitutional rights and the privacy of citizens, the military’s 
involvement with domestic intelligence collection is severely limited.  The Department of 
Defense Directives 5240.1, DoD Intelligence Activities, and 5240.1R, Procedures 
Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect U.S. Persons,160 
strictly govern what information may be collected concerning U.S. persons.  The term 
“U.S. Persons” is expansively defined.  While these directives technically apply only to 
the military intelligence establishment, many of the normal missions conducted by 
Special Forces would likely be considered intelligence activities if conducted in the 
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United States.  Equally important, the controversy generated by any mission appearing to 
collect information on U.S. citizens would be substantial.   
In broad terms, any action resembling intelligence collection within the U.S. must 
be carefully considered and related to foreign intelligence or counterintelligence.  Thus, 
any domestic SF mission involving intelligence, surveillance or reconnaissance would 
need to be carefully synchronized with, and in support of, civilian law enforcement or 
elements of the intelligence community, and receive a legal review prior to 
commencement.   
B. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS UNIQUE TO THE NATIONAL GUARD 
1. Legal Status of the National Guard 
The National Guard is at all times a state entity unless and until called to active, 
federal duty.161  Constitutionally created, the National Guard is not only a state agency, 
but a reserve component of the United States military.162  As a result, National Guard 
forces operate in multiple statuses, each with particular constraints and limitations:    
a. Title 10 Status — Federal Funding and Control  
When called to active, federal duty under the provisions of Title 10 of the 
U.S. Code, National Guard forces are relieved of their state obligations until restored to 
state status.163  This “federalization” is normally in response to wartime requirements, 
although some legal provisions allow for mobilization for domestic emergencies.  The 
specific authorities for calling the National Guard into federal service are discussed 
below.   
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b. Title 32 Status — Federal Funding; State Control   
Title 32 status is the most common status for National Guard members.  
Drill weekends and annual training are conducted in this status, and guardsmen receive 
federal pay and benefits for participating. Despite federal funding, in this status the 
National Guard remains under the command and control of the state governor.  In 
addition to drill weekends and annual training, National Guard members may be called to 
Title 32 duty for training or “other duty.” 164  
c. State Active Duty — State Funding; State Control   
Since the National Guard is primarily a state organization, governors have 
the legal authority to utilize National Guard forces for state operations and emergencies, 
pursuant to state law.  However, since these state functions are not tied to the National 
Guard’s role as a reserve component, the state must absorb the cost of these operations, 
including pay and allowances as dictated by state law.     
2. Mobilization / Activation Authorities 
National Guard troops are primarily a part-time force, serving one weekend a 
month in Title 32 status.  In almost all National Guard units, a small cadre of personnel 
performs full-time National Guard duty (FTNGD).  The FTNGD soldiers primarily 
provide administrative and logistics support to maintain continuity between training 
assemblies.165  More precisely, these soldiers serve for the purpose of “organizing, 
administering, recruiting, instructing, or training” the National Guard.166  Specific legal 
authority is required to mobilize or activate the National Guard in response to a homeland 
security crisis.  The simplest and most efficient mobilization authority is a governor’s 
authority to mobilize his or her National Guard forces in state active duty status (SAD).  
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In some cases, such as the National Guard’s response to Hurricane Katrina, the Secretary 
of Defense has authorized retroactive Title 32 duty status — which keeps the National 
Guard under state command and control, but provides federal pay and benefits.  
Mobilizing the National Guard units into federal service can be pursuant to one of eight 
separate statutes: full mobilization for the duration of a war or emergency declared by 
Congress,167 partial mobilization of up to 100,000 members of the ready reserve 
(including the National Guard) for up to two years following a presidential declaration,168 
a presidential reserve call up of up to 200,000 members (of the reserve components) for 
up to 270 days169 to repel invasions or rebellions,170 to quell insurrections, or to suppress 
domestic violence and lawlessness,171 a fifteen-day call to federal duty, generally used 
for training purposes, 172 and individuals may be called to active federal duty in order to 
receive medical care.173  
One additional legal mechanism known as “hip pocket activation” allows for a 
rapid federalization under certain conditions.  With prior planning and coordination, 
National Guard forces can be instantaneously “federalized” in the event of a domestic 
emergencies and contingency operations.  Specifically, section 12301(d) of U.S. Code 
Title 10, provides that members of the National Guard may be called to active federal 
duty with their governor’s consent.  The U.S. Air Force currently uses this provision in a 
procedure to “automatically convert consenting Air National Guard members into Title 
10 (federal) status upon the occurrence of a triggering event.”174  As a result, during an 
“air sovereignty event,” Air Guard pilots can launch fighter jets in federal status to 
                                                 
167 10 USC 12301(a). 
168 10 USC 12302(a)  
169 10 USC 12304.  
170 10 USC 12406.  
171 10 USC 331-333, the Insurrection Act.  
172 10 USC 12301(b).  
173 10 USC 12301(h).  
174 U.S. Army, Judge Advocate Center and School, Center for Domestic Operational Law, Domestic 
Operational Law (DOPLAW) Handbook for Judge Advocates, Charlottesville, VA.  July 18, 2006.  
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defend the United States.175  This mechanism requires the individual guardsmen to 
volunteer ahead of time and a memorandum of agreement to be executed with the 
governor involved.  Such a mechanism could be emplaced to allow selected Army 
National Guard Special Forces units to rapidly respond to regional or national events 
across state lines.  This assumes, however, that the part-time Army National Guard 
Special Forces unit can be rapidly called into service and launched on a mission.  In 
reality, the National Guard can be mobilized in a fairly efficient manner, but not in a way 
that could be described as rapid.  Traditional guard soldiers have jobs and families.  They 
often do not live in the same town where their unit is located.  At best, it would be several 
hours before an organic unit could be assembled and moving toward an objective.  To 
account for this, Florida calls its Special Forces to active duty in advance of approaching 
storms of a given magnitude.  Obviously, this method is only effective for forecasted 
events.   
Relatively recently, Congress granted specific authorization to call National 
Guard forces to Title 32 active duty for the specific purpose of homeland defense.  
Chapter 9 of Title 32 provides a mechanism for placing National Guard service members 
on active duty status for missions approved by the secretary of defense.  Since the length 
of duty under this chapter is limited to one six-month tour, the missions contemplated by 
this law are short-duration, one-time occurrences — not designed for a durational 
capability.   
The consistent theme in most all of these mobilization authorities is activation in 
response to a war or emergency.  Thus, these legal authorities are responsive in nature 
and not proactive or even preemptive.  Assuming funding is available, National Guard 
soldiers can be placed on Title 32 orders for operational support.176  For example, the 
National Guard’s counterdrug program is comprised of National Guard soldiers and 
airmen who are on active duty orders to support specific counterdrug assignments.  This 
same Active Duty for Operational Support (ADOS) status can be utilized to place entire 
units on Title 32 active duty.  In considering options for placing Army National Guard 
                                                 
175 Domestic Operational Law (DOPLAW) Handbook for Judge Advocates. 
176 32 USC 502(f). 
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Special Forces on active duty orders to conduct long-term homeland security operations, 
Title 32 ADOS is likely the most feasible option.  Once on full-time status, the “hip 
pocket activation” would be available to federalize the SF unit for national contingencies 
or to respond to emergencies across state lines under federal control.   
3. Crossing State Borders 
Not all states have Army Special Forces within their National Guard composition.  
Consequently, any discussion of Army National Guard Special Forces must contemplate 
cross-border operations to support neighboring states or to conduct regional contingency 
operations.  If operating in Title 10, federal status, crossing state borders is permissible 
pursuant to federal law.  State governors may send National Guard forces in Title 32 or 
SAD status to another state by mutual agreement.  A more formal alternative is the 
Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC).  EMAC is a mutual aid 
agreement enacted by the legislatures of all states.  This compact allows states to request 
and receive support from other states in the event of declared emergencies.  Article I of 
the compact includes support in the form of National Guard forces.  The emergencies 
contemplated in the articles of the compact are natural or man-made disasters, 
technological hazards, civil emergency aspects of resource shortages, community 
disorders, insurgency, or enemy attacks.  Congress ratified this mutual aid compact in 
1996, giving the EMAC process legal protections and a firm contractual agreement 
between states.  States may obtain reimbursement from the requesting state under the 
terms of the compact.  Since the compact does not contemplate the use of military force, 
a separate state-to-state agreement may be needed in order to send troops with the 
purpose of using National Guard troops in a law enforcement capacity.   
4. Fiscal Law Constraints 
The National Guard receives the vast bulk of its funding through federal 
appropriations.  As a result, fiscal law limits the expenditure of these funds to the purpose 
of the appropriation; normally training for federal wartime missions.  Whether the 
National Guard truly has a homeland security mission or purpose is still up for debate; 
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since there is no funding to train specifically for homeland security.  Currently, the only 
National Guard element funded to train and operate specifically for homeland security is 
the Civil Support Teams.  All other training or operations conducted by the National 
Guard must have a federal mission nexus.  Missions conducted in support of state 
emergencies must normally be conducted in State Active Duty (SAD) status with the 
state government paying the bill.   On rare occasions such as Hurricane Katrina, Title 32 
status and federal funding is authorized.  Since homeland security is not yet codified in 
law or doctrine as a mission of the National Guard, the homeland security missions 
contemplated in this thesis would need a specific authorization and funding source to be 
legally compliant.   
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V. POTENTIAL HOMELAND SECURITY MISSIONS FOR U.S. 
ARMY SPECIAL FORCES 
This chapter begins by describing the homeland security doctrinal environment.  
Specifically, the two specific military responsibilities: Homeland Defense and Defense 
Support of Civil Authorities.  Within this doctrinal context, and based on the lessons 
learned from the case studies, the canons of Special Forces core tasks, collateral activities 
and core competencies are applied to identify potential missions for Special Forces.   
A. HOMELAND SECURITY DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK 
 “Homeland security” is defined in The National Strategy for Homeland Security 
as “a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce 
America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks 
that do occur.”177  The Department of Homeland Security is the lead agency for 
homeland security, and the Department of Justice is the lead agency for law enforcement 
at the federal level.  The Department of Defense, including the Army, is tasked to support 
these efforts through Homeland Defense and Civil Support operations.178  In other words, 
Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) are two 
overlapping and supporting military missions sustaining national homeland security.  
“Homeland defense” is defined by The Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil 
Support as “the protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical 
defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression, or other threats as directed 
by the president.”179  The DoD is the lead agency for homeland defense.  “Defense 
support to civil authorities” is defined by The Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil 
Support as “DoD support including federal military forces, the department’s career 
                                                 
177 The White House, The National Strategy for Homeland Security, Washington, DC, July, 2002, 2. 
178 Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, Washington, DC, June 
2005.  
179 Ibid., 5. 
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civilian and contractor personnel and component assets, for domestic emergencies and for 
designated law enforcement and other activities.”180   
The Department of Defense Joint Publications (JP) elaborating on these missions 
are JP 3-26.1, Homeland Defense (2007) and JP 3-28, Civil Support (2007).  Both 
publications clarify the Army’s roles and responsibilities in homeland security.  The 
Army has major responsibilities within the homeland security joint – interagency 
framework.  For example, the commander of U.S. Army North, the subordinate service 
component of NORTHCOM, is “generally responsible for conducting homeland defense 
land operations.”181  These responsibilities may include conducting operations such as 
“forcible entry from land, sea or air; decisive fires and maneuver, closing with and 
destroying a determined enemy” and other ground combat tasks.182  In short, JP 3-27, 
Homeland Defense, requires the Army to be prepared to conduct full-spectrum operations 
in the United States, its territories and possessions.    Such operations may include the 
core tasks for Special Forces envisioned in FM 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations, 
including direct actions missions.  In fact, JP 3-27 recognizes the potential for domestic 
special operations.  However, since Special Forces Operations does not discuss 
homeland defense unique tasks, this chapter will contain only those missions which 
might occur short of actual conflict.   
All homeland security doctrine published recognizes that the reserve components, 
particularly the National Guard, possess a tremendous capacity to conduct Homeland 
Defense and DSCA missions.  Within the National Guard, the Army National Guard will 
bear the primary responsibility for these missions due to its overwhelming proportion of 
force structure within the Guard.  Thus, the mission profiles discussed here are suitable 
for Army National Guard Special Forces as well as their active-duty counterparts.  These 
potential homeland security missions and their doctrinal origin are summarized in the 
table below. 
                                                 
180 Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support. 
181 Department of Defense, Joint Publication (JP) 3-27, Homeland Defense, Washington, DC, July 12, 
2007,  II-6.  
182 Ibid., IV-2.  
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Core Tasks  
Combat Task Potential HLS Task 
Foreign Internal Defense (FID) Training Law Enforcement Interagency Partners in 
Advanced Skills in order to Combat Terrorism; Security 
Operations. 
Direct Action (DA) Direct Action and or Technical Advice to Civilian Law 
Enforcement Agencies. 
Strategic Reconnaissance (SR) Post Event Damage Assessment & Communication 
Support. 
 
Border or Port Surveillance 
 
Vulnerability Assessments & Red Teaming. 
 
Unconventional Warfare (UW)  
Counterterrorism (CT) Counterterrorism. 
Enabling Force for National Assets.   
Counterproliferation (CP) Counterproliferation. 
 Collateral Activities 
Coalition Support Liaison Element to Interagency Partners. 
Communications Support to Interagency Partners. 
Combat Search and Rescue Search and Rescue. 
Counterdrug Activities Counterdrug Activities. 
Countermine Activities Counter Domestic Improvised Explosive Device (IED) 
Activities 
Humanitarian Assistance Humanitarian Assistance 
Special Activities  
Special Capabilities 
Underwater Operations (SCUBA)  Underwater Operations (SCUBA) 
(Port Security Applications) 
Waterborne Operations Waterborne Operations 
Advance Communications Advanced Communications 
Table 2.   Potential Homeland Security Missions for Special Forces 
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B. POTENTIAL HOMELAND DEFENSE MISSIONS. 
1. Random Anti Terrorism Measures (RAM)   
Terrorist want to avoid the unexpected and unpredictable.  Because maintaining a 
constant impenetrable level of security at all potential terrorist targets is unrealistic and 
cost prohibitive, unpredictable surges and demonstrations of force help keep terrorist 
groups off balance.  Special Forces teams can conduct random surge operations designed 
to illustrate the irregularity and/or invisibility of security measures.  For example, a 
Special Forces detachment could conduct seemingly random visits to defense critical 
infrastructure such as nuclear reactors or oil refineries, bolstering the security force.  
Depending on the threat analysis, the RAM operations could be high-visibility events 
such as landing on the infrastructure site in helicopters, in uniform, with their full 
complement of weapons and equipment.  On the other hand, the RAM could be 
conducted in a low-visibility manner using civilian vehicles and plain clothes.  Terrorists 
conducting reconnaissance, surveillance or pre-attack preparations would, at a minimum, 
be forced to reevaluate their plans.  A RAM’s effectiveness can be enhanced by 
coordinated media coverage — possibly termed a training event for future, potential 
security events.  The RAMs duration can be short or it can last for days.  For example, 
the SF detachment could stay on-site to conduct joint training with the security force, and 
become familiar with a potential terrorist target for future reference.  When executed 
properly, effective interagency relationships can be built prior to a security event or 
disaster.  Likewise, a RAM could be conducted in conjunction with, or followed by, a 
vulnerability assessment of the infrastructure by the SF detachment.   RAMs are not only 
well suited for infrastructure, but also other locations effecting homeland security, such 
as border crossings and ports.   
2. Vulnerability Assessments / Red Teaming   
As previously discussed, one of the core tasks for Special Forces is the direct 
action (DA) mission.  Special Forces train to infiltrate into an overseas area of operation 
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in order to “seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets.”183  
The DA mission differs from a conventional attack because of the small size of the SF 
force and the specialized, unconventional techniques employed by Special Forces.  This 
unconventional mind set and their combined arms capability makes Special Forces 
ideally suited to determine how a clandestine group might attempt to attack specific 
targets in the United States.  Special Forces detachments can provide a “red team” 
analysis of potential terrorist targets.  In other words, the SF detachment would assume 
the role of terrorist in order to identify vulnerabilities and weaknesses in the 
government’s security posture.  The “red team” analysis could include surveillance and 
reconnaissance on the “target,” complete with photographs and video, identifying 
vulnerable patterns and weaknesses.   
For several years, the National Guard Bureau has touted the Guard’s capability to 
conduct Critical Infrastructure Protection vulnerability assessments.  Originally the 
program was called Full Spectrum, Integrated Vulnerability Assessments (FSIVA).  The 
current terminology used by the National Guard Bureau is Critical Infrastructure 
Protection – Mission Assurance Assessments (CIP-MAA).  Under this concept, “National 
Guard CIP-MAA Detachments conduct all-hazards risk assessments on prioritized 
federal and state critical infrastructure in support of the Defense Critical Infrastructure 
Program (DCIP).”  This program, however, is being conducted on a very small scale.  
Currently, only six states are authorized and resourced for the CIP-MAA program.  The 
proposal contained in Chapter VII may offer a mechanism to greatly enhance this 
capability. 
3. Special Reconnaissance in Support of Homeland Defense      
Special Forces can support homeland defense operations by conducting SR to 
observe and report on suspicious activities potentially tied to terrorist activities or other 
transnational threats.   While the vast majority of these missions are more appropriate for 
civilian law enforcement, there may be some scenarios that require a skill set unique to 
                                                 
183 Department of the Army Field Manual (FM) 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations, October 10, 
2006, 3-1.  
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Special Forces.  For example, if intelligence indicated that a terrorist group will attempt 
to move a WMD across the Southwest Border in a remote location in Arizona, a SF team 
could be assigned the missions to conduct surveillance of the border location from a 
concealed hide site.  Likewise, the waterborne and SCUBA capabilities found in Special 
Forces can be utilized to conduct surveillance of suspicious ships, either in U.S. ports or 
approaching ports.  Yet another potential application is SR conducted on suspected 
terrorist training camps or safe houses.   In these limited cases, the SF detachment could 
serve as a force multiplier for the DoD or federal law enforcement agency conducting the 
investigation.  In other situations, the SF detachment could provide the training needed 
for the law enforcement agency in order to conduct the operation.   
4. Security Operations  
While most security operations are much more appropriate for civilian law 
enforcement agencies, the Department of Defense does support a wide variety of high-
threat, special events in the United States.  For example, federal law specifically 
authorizes DoD support to certain sporting events such as the Olympics, World Cup 
Soccer or the Super Bowl.184  Likewise, events designated as National Special Security 
Events (NSSE) receive military support.185  For example, the Department of Defense 
supported the World Trade Organization (WTO) conference in Seattle, Washington, in 
1999 as a NSSE.186  The National Guard may support a NSSE as part of the federal DoD 
effort, or under the confines of their state role.  For example, the Washington National 
Guard supported the 1999 Seattle WTO conference in accordance with the Washington 
                                                 
184 10 USC 2564(a):  “At the request of a federal, state, or local government agency responsible for 
providing law enforcement services, security services, or safety services, the Secretary of Defense may 
authorize the commander of a military installation or other facility of the Department of Defense or the 
commander of a specified or unified combatant command to provide assistance for the World Cup Soccer 
Games, the Goodwill Games, the Olympics, and any other civilian sporting event in support of essential 
security and safety at such event, but only if the Attorney General certifies that such assistance is necessary 
to meet essential security and safety needs.”  
185 Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO), U.S. Army Judge Advocate School, Domestic 
Operational Law (DOPLAW) handbook for Judge Advocates, Charlottesville, VA, July 18, 2006.    144, 
citing Presidential Decision Directive 62 (PDD 62), Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the 
Homeland and Americans Overseas (May 22, 1998) (classified secret).  
186 Ibid.  
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State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan.187  Within this context, Special 
Forces detachments can provide security assistance or expertise to special events.  Such 
assistance could include serving as a Personnel Security Detachment (PSD) for 
dignitaries or other sensitive security functions that require a high level of professional 
skills and abilities.  Additionally, SF teams could provide “red teaming” or vulnerability 
assessments for events as discussed above.   
5. Enabling Force for National Assets Conducting Counterterrorism or 
Counterproliferation Missions  
Counterterrorism (CT) and/or Counterproliferation missions conducted in the 
United States, whether by Department of Defense or other governmental agencies, are 
likely classified operations beyond the scope of this thesis.  However, while Special 
Forces may not execute these missions, they can serve as an enabling force for a 
Department of Defense special mission unit.  The SF detachment can provide additional 
security, logistical or communications support as required.  Depending on the location of 
the counterterrorism operation, the SF detachment may be able to assist in mission 
preparation by providing critical information on the local area.  In short, a Special Forces 
detachment can perform an advance party support role during a response by national 
assets.       
6. Direct Action 
The use of U.S. military forces in any domestic operation is distasteful at best.  
The military conducting combat operations in the United States could be considered as 
the nightmare scenario.  Nonetheless, this eventuality must be contemplated given the 
contemporary operating environment.  A realistic assumption can be made that any 
domestic combat operation, short of a true military engagement, will be conducted by 
DoD national-level assets.  Given a broad and sustained terrorism campaign such as IED 
attacks, school bombings or mass transit attacks, however, the military, and Special 
Forces in particular, could be required to conduct direct action missions to defeat terrorist 
                                                 
187 Domestic Operational Law (DOPLAW), handbook for Judge Advocates.  
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cells.  These missions could be in the form of combined operations with civilian law 
enforcement or unilateral operations.  Likewise, National Guard Special Forces, 
operating in their state status, unconstrained by the Posse Comitatus Act, could be 
ordered to operate as a law enforcement entity to kill or capture terrorists operating in the 
United States.          
C. POTENTIAL DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES MISSIONS 
1. Training and Advice to Interagency Partners  
As previously discussed, training others is a core competency of Special Forces.  
Success in Unconventional Warfare and Foreign Internal Defense missions largely 
depends on the ability to proliferate capabilities in allied forces.  In peacetime, Special 
Forces continue to train military, paramilitary, or police forces through mobile training 
teams while conducting the collateral activity of security assistance.188  Fundamental to 
all of these missions is the recognition that, by training others, the United States may 
avoid, minimize, or reduce its involvement in overseas conflicts.  As demonstrated in the 
Florida case study, Special Forces soldiers possess skills useful to civilian agencies, 
especially law enforcement.  Through training, Special Forces can enhance the skills and 
capabilities of interagency partners, and possibly reduce the potential for use or misuse of 
the military in domestic law enforcement operations.  At the same time, by training 
others, Special Forces increase their own wartime readiness to conduct UW and FID.  
Equally important, training interagency partners builds relationships that enhance 
interagency operability during times of crisis.   Within the legal limitations discussed 
previously, Special Forces can enhance interagency skill sets in the foundational skills of 
SF: weapons, explosives, communications, and emergency medical procedures.  
Additionally, Special Forces can instruct interagency partners on many other tactics, 
techniques and procedures, such as maritime, air mobile and urban operations.  Implicit 
in this concept is a validated request from the law enforcement or other federal, state or 
local governmental agency.  The interagency partner knows best what assistance is 
                                                 
188 U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations, June 2001, 2-23.  
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needed, if any.  This study only recognizes that within the Army, Special Forces are the 
ideal educators to enhance interagency operations.     
2. Humanitarian Assistance  
Foreign humanitarian assistance is a collateral activity of Special Forces.  “The 
ability to deploy on short notice to remote regions, familiarity with multiagency 
operations, and limited logistics support requirements, all favor SF involvement in 
disaster relief operations.”189  Within the context of domestic operations, these same 
advantages exist.  Special Forces are well suited for some specific tasks that exceed the 
capabilities of first responders.  Examples include distributing relief supplies or providing 
emergency medical support in remote or isolated locations.  Likewise, Special Forces 
involvement may be well suited for domestic disaster response operations in areas 
experiencing civil unrest.        
3. Special Reconnaissance for DSCA Operations  
The National Guard currently conducts domestic surveillance and reconnaissance 
operations in support of civilian law enforcement agencies.  Specifically, two ongoing 
operations fall into the doctrinal framework of defense support to civil authorities 
(DSCA).  First, as discussed in the Florida case study above, National Guard Special 
Forces counterdrug personnel support civilian law enforcement by providing 
reconnaissance and surveillance on suspected drug trafficking locations such as 
clandestine drug labs or trans-shipment locations.  Likewise, National Guard personnel 
are currently conducting reconnaissance and surveillance on the Southwest Border in 
support of Operation Jump Start.  Entry identification teams identify illegal aliens 
crossing the border in remote locations and notify the border patrol for apprehension.  
Similar operations, including counterdrug operations, in support of civil authorities 
requiring SF unique skills or abilities may be appropriate DSCA missions for Special 
Forces.   
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4. Interagency Liaison Teams (SF Liaison Element)    
Previously, SF liaison elements were known as “Coalition Support Teams.”  
Under current doctrine, SF conducts the collateral activity of serving as a Special Forces 
Liaison Element (SFLE) to conventional U.S. forces and foreign allies.  The mission of a 
SFLE is to establish rapport, educate, and determine requirements and expectations of the 
supported unit or coalition partner’s headquarters.190   The intent of liaison missions is to 
improve the interaction and interoperability of coalition partners and U.S. military 
forces.191  In combat operations, the “SFLE advise their foreign counterparts on U.S. 
military intentions, capabilities, provide training, provide global positioning system 
downlinks, and secure communications between the supported forces.”192  In major 
homeland security operations, the same or similar liaison tasks can assist civilian 
agencies, state or local governments or non governmental organizations such as the Red 
Cross, and operate alongside and with military forces. A SFLE can help bridge the gap 
between civilian methods and procedures and military operations.  SF teams could advise 
interagency partners operating in the disaster area on the intentions, capabilities and 
limitations of military forces.  Stated differently, the SF liaison team can explain what the 
military is doing — and why — to interagency partners that may have a limited 
understanding of the military.  Additionally, as demonstrated during Hurricane Katrina, 
Special Forces conducting coalition support or liaison operations can enhance the 
collective efficiency of interagency operations.  While domestic operations do not rely on 
regional orientation and cultural awareness, the level of professionalism and maturity 
found in Special Forces soldiers makes them well suited to conduct homeland security 
liaison missions with civilian, interagency partners.   
5. Communications Support to Interagency Partners   
Special Forces can serve as communications teams to support large-scale response 
operations involving multiple civilian agencies.  This mission can be executed in 
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conjunction with or independent of a larger liaison mission.  In the post-September 11 
world, interoperable communications remain a challenge.  Despite the realization that 
interoperable communications are paramount in effective disaster response operations, 
not all potential interagency partners have interoperable systems.  Poor communications 
will remain a challenge in all large-scale domestic operations involving multiple civilian 
agencies.  Special Forces detachments are trained and equipped with sophisticated 
communications systems capable of sending voice or data messages from great distances 
in hostile environments.  Two Special Forces communications sergeants serve on a 
Special Forces detachment.  In addition, all detachment members are cross-trained to 
operate the communications systems assigned to the team.  In some situations, SF 
detachments operate as two “split teams.”  As a result, the detachment is generally 
equipped with two of each communications system.  Therefore, a Special Forces 
detachment can field two or possibly more communications teams to civilian interagency 
partners.  These teams would establish and maintain a communications channel between 
various civilian agencies command posts, allowing them to send and receive real-time 
messages in emergencies.   
6. Search and Rescue Operations  
Special Forces perform combat search and rescue operations as a collateral 
activity.  This means that SF possesses the capability to conduct combat search and 
rescue, but “is not specifically manned, trained, or equipped” to conduct these 
operations.193  As documented in the Hurricane Katrina case studies infra, Special Forces 
are uniquely well suited to conduct some search and rescue operations as part of DSCA 
operations.  Rescues requiring Special Forces unique skills or equipment, such as 
SCUBA or waterborne operations, are a prime example.  Likewise, search operations in 
very remote areas or under extreme weather conditions might be suitable for Special 
Forces participation.  Finally, other missions dependent on advanced communications 
ability or conducted as part of a larger interagency effort might be appropriate for Special 
Forces.   
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VI. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION. 
Considering the research and analysis developed above, this chapter makes 
modest proposals that will enhance the ability of Special Forces to contribute to 
homeland security operations.  The first proposal impacts both active component and 
National Guard Special Forces, while the second proposal is specific to the Army 
National Guard. 
A. PUBLISH DOCTRINE FOR SPECIAL FORCES HOMELAND SECURITY 
OPERATIONS 
Current doctrine should be revised to contain an explanation of appropriate 
missions and tasks for Special Forces in homeland security operations.  Alternatively, a 
separate field manual could be developed.  Whether existing doctrine is revised or new 
doctrine published, the appropriate role for SF within homeland security operations needs 
to be defined in advance of future natural or man-made disasters.  Additionally, this 
proposed doctrine should recognize the unique nature of the Army National Guard 
Special Forces units, and provide guidance for the appropriate use of Army National 
Guard Special Forces by their home-state governors in domestic operations.    
Army field manual (FM) 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations, is the doctrinal 
foundation for Special Forces.  It describes “SF roles, missions, capabilities, 
organizations, command and control, employment, and sustainment operations across the 
operational continuum.”194  FM 3-05.20 is subordinate doctrine to FM 3-05, Army 
Special Operations Forces.   Likewise, FM 3-05.20 provides the basis for all subordinate 
Special Forces specific doctrine.  An inventory of subordinate doctrine is contained 
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FM 3-05.201 
SF Unconventional Warfare 
FM 3-05.213 
SF Use of Pack Animals 
FM 3-05.202 
SF Foreign Internal Defense 
FM 3-05.214 
SF Vehicle Mounted Operations 
FM 3-05.203 
SF Direct Action TTP 
FM 3-05.220 
SF Advanced Special Operations 
FM 3-05.204 
SF Special Reconnaissance TTP 
FM 3-05.221 
SF Advanced Urban Combat 
FM 3-05.210 
Special Forces Air Operations 
FM 3-05.222 
SF Sniper Training and Employment 
FM 3-05.211 
SF Military Free Fall Operations 
FM 3-05.230 
SF Base Camp Operations 
FM 3-05.212 
SF Waterborne Operations 
FM 3-05.231 
SF Personnel Recovery 
Table 3.   Special Forces Doctrine 
 
As the table above demonstrates, the library of Special Forces doctrine covers 
some of the core Special Forces tasks, infiltration techniques, and specialized skills.  
Some of these field manuals are classified.   Stated simply, FM 3-05.20, Special Forces 
Operations describes what Special Forces does, and the subordinate doctrine explains 
tactics, techniques and procedures to accomplish the specific mission or task.  Missing 
within Special Forces Operations and its subordinate doctrine is any discussion or 
explanation of what Special Forces do in the homeland security environment.  It may be 
advantageous to focus the efforts of Special Forces overseas, eliminating threats and 
shaping the security environment.  However, the nature of warfighting has changed.  Our 
adversaries have already attacked the homeland and are committed to attempting 
additional attacks.   Thus, in today’s environment, assuming Special Forces will not be 
employed in the United States is a bold and likely incorrect assumption.  Failure to define 
appropriate roles and missions during domestic operations could lead to a misuse of a key 
asset or to the creation of negative perceptions in the populace. 
Homeland Security operations are best described as a type of mission within the 
range of military operations.  Likewise, civil support operations are one of the four types 
of missions found in full-spectrum operations.  In any homeland security operation, 
Special Forces will likely employ tactics, techniques and procedures from their 
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Unconventional Warfare toolbox.  Moreover, many of the Special Forces core 
competencies will be required in order to be successful.  Thus, an additional chapter 
within Special Forces Operations is the most suitable location for a discussion of SF 
homeland security operations.  While many of the same SF tactics, techniques and 
procedures are applicable to homeland security operations, the operating environment is 
radically different.  For example, DoD will almost always be in a supporting role to 
another governmental agency.  Additionally, homeland security requires a collaborative 
effort rather than a pure unity of command model.  Furthermore, the interagency partners 
have a different common operating framework than the Army.  Without a doctrinal 
framework, Special Forces will operate at a disadvantage.  More importantly, civilian and 
conventional force military leaders will lack an understanding of what missions and tasks 
are feasible, acceptable and suitable for Special Forces.  This doctrinal void could lead to 
the improper employment of Special Forces.    
B. AUTHORIZE AND ESTABLISH FULL-TIME NATIONAL GUARD 
DUTY SPECIAL FORCES DETACHMENTS 
The states that possess Special Forces within their Army National Guard force 
structure should be federally authorized and funded to maintain a twelve-man, Special 
Forces Operational Detachment on Title 32 full-time National Guard Duty (FTNGD) 
status.  This full-time status should be under the construct of Additional Duty for 
Operational Support (ADOS).  This status would enable the service members to continue 
to participate as members of their National Guard Special Forces unit, thus maintaining 
combat readiness.   This proposal represents a significant paradigm shift from the 
traditional concept of a part-time military force.  The threats found in the contemporary 
operating environment, however, demand a shift from obsolete methods.   The ability for 
an immediate combined arms response, enhanced interagency relationships, and a 
domestic, forward-deployed special operations capability represent the value innovation 
contained in this proposal.   Currently, each state has only one type of full-time National 
Guard unit capable of immediate response: the Civil Support Team.  While extremely 
beneficial, the CST is a specialized WMD response capability.  A Special Forces 
detachment on the other hand represents a small, but highly skilled, combined arms team 
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capable of conducting a broad array of operations.  This dedicated homeland security 
force would be immediately available to conduct the Special Forces core tasks and 
collateral activities discussed in this thesis. This would provide governors and the 
president a pre-positioned, mission-ready team of special operators to conduct homeland 
security activities before, during and after natural or man-made disasters.  For example, 
in the event of a land- or sea-based, mass-migration event across the U.S. border, a full-
time Special Forces detachment could be immediately deployed by helicopter to the area.  
Using their organic communications equipment, the detachment would report their 
assessment of the situation and prepare for follow-on forces.  Likewise, in the event of a 
terrorist bombing, the FTNGD SF detachment could rapidly deploy in order to gauge and 
report the required composition of military support needed.  Not only would these teams 
be able to assist in consequence management, they would provide an additional means to 
support the identification, prevention, deterrence and disruption of potential terrorist acts.  
More routine applications could include training interagency partners in counterterrorism 
skills in order to enhance their homeland security posture, conducting vulnerability 
assessments of critical infrastructure and red teaming domestic threat scenarios.   
Additionally, utilizing the “hip pocket” activation concept discussed above, 
FTNGD Special Forces detachments could be immediately federalized in order to 
respond as required across state lines as a regional capability.   Likewise, this unit would 
represent a domestic, forward-deployed Special Forces element for national-level 
contingencies.    
By placing the Army National Guard Special Forces detachment on full-time duty 
under Title 32 (federally funded, state controlled), all issues related to the Posse 
Comitatus Act are avoided — at least until the unit is called into federal service.  For this 
proposal to be most effective, current Department of Defense policies concerning 
training, and advising civilian law enforcement and other interagency partners, should be 
modified.  The very real concern regarding the content and quality of training provided to 
civilian law enforcement can be managed through a standardized, Department of Defense 
approved program of instruction.  Public relations efforts concerning these full-time 
detachments should focus on the civil support aspects rather than the homeland defense 
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missions in order to alleviate concerns regarding civil liberties.  Emphasis should be 
placed on the medical, communications and engineering support to the interagency team, 
rather than on the potential missions to detect or disrupt terrorist cells.  Some missions 
should be performed in a low-visibility manner, perhaps in civilian clothes.   
The major objections to this proposal will include the idea that it is unnecessary to 
maintain a unit on National Guard active duty status when National Guard forces can be 
rapidly called into service.  In reality, the National Guard can be mobilized in a fairly 
efficient manner, but not in a way that could be described as rapid.  Traditional guard 
soldiers have jobs and families.  They often do not live in the same town where their unit 
is located.  At best, it would be several hours before an organic unit could be assembled 
and moving toward an objective.  Additionally, a larger conventional force means larger 
numbers of soldiers, which, in turn, requires larger transportation assets.  Finally, even if 
a conventional force could be rapidly assembled and deployed to an emergency, this unit 
would not have the combined arms capability of a SF unit.  Since SF detachments contain 
medics, engineers, intelligence, communications and weapons specialist, the combined 
capabilities would be difficult to match in any sized conventional unit.  Similarly, some 
critics might contend that conventional National Guard forces can do many of the tasks 
outlined above.  This criticism is true.  However, other than the civil support teams found 
in each state, there is no standing National Guard unit of any type on National Guard 
active duty.  Given current budget constraints, maintaining a twelve-man Special Forces 
detachment on active duty provides a much greater cost-benefit ratio than a much larger 
conventional force. 
C. ISSUES FOR FURTHER STUDY   
Two issues related to command and control of Special Forces during domestic 
operations merit further research and consideration.  First, what are the best practices 
when Army National Guard Special Forces operate in combined multi-state operations 
under state active duty (SAD) or Title 32 status such as the Hurricane Katrina scenario?  
Secondly, who has command and control of Army National Guard Special Forces when 
called to federal service for a domestic crisis?   
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Multi-state National Guard operations conducted under the command of home-
state governors are rare and, by their nature, a collaborative effort.  Command options 
should be identified to facilitate unity of effort.  These options may include voluntarily 
ceding operational control (OPCON) or tactical control (TACON) to another state 
providing a Special Forces headquarters, placing the Special Forces elements on a Title 
10 status through “hip pocket” activation or a fifteen-day involuntary federal 
mobilization, or simply coordinating mutually supportive actions while remaining 
independent operations.  Each method has potential advantages and disadvantages worthy 
of study. 
A federal activation for domestic operations generates separate command and 
control issues.  Army National Guard forces ordered to federal active duty for a 
Homeland Defense or Support to Civil Authority mission will presumably fall under the 
command and control of U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM).  However, all 
active and reserve component (Title 10) Special Forces units in the Continental United 
States are under the Command of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), 
unless otherwise specifically directed by Secretary of Defense.195  JP 3-27, Homeland 
Defense, states, “when directed, CDRUSSOCOM relinquishes OPCON/TACON of U.S.-
based SOF and OPCON/TACON is assumed by CDRUSNORTHCOM for HD 
operations in the USNORTHCOM AOR.  Thus, in the event of a large-scale homeland 
security contingency requiring the mobilization of the Army National Guard, confusion 
may result over which combatant commander has command and control over Army 
National Guard Special Forces.  Likewise, many state adjutants general may not fully 
understand this distinction. This situation is further compounded by the fact that, unlike 
other theater combatant commands, U.S. Northern Command does not have a Theater 
Special Operations Command.  Previous authors have commented on the need for a 
USNORTHCOM Special Operations Command (or SOC North); however, none have 
                                                 
195 10 USC 167.  
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addressed the potential disorder to command and control of Army National Guard Special 
Forces called to active, federal duty in the United States.196 
D. CONCLUSION 
Army Special Forces, especially Army National Guard Special Forces, will be 
involved in future homeland defense and civil support operations.  Doctrine for domestic 
Special Forces operations should be developed to provide guidance on the proper 
employment of Special Forces.  Considering the operational demands placed on Special 
Forces, any domestic operations doctrine should be based on current core tasks and the 
traditional collateral activities of Special Forces.   States that have an Army National 
Guard force structure should be authorized to maintain one SFODA on full-time National 
Guard duty status in order to enhance the homeland security posture of both their home 
state and the United States.      
                                                 
196 See Major Gay McGillis, “Organizing NORTHCOM for Success: A Theater Special Operations 
Command.”  United States Army Command and General Staff College (Academic Year 02-03), and Otis 
McGregor III, “Command and Control of Special Operations Forces Missions in the U.S. Northern 
Command Area of Responsibility.” Naval Postgraduate School (March 2005). 
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